Transcript: Confirmation Hearing of Robert Gates to Be Secretary of Defense

SPEAKERS:

U.S. SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER (R-VA) CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ)
U.S. SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE (R-OK)
U.S. SENATOR PAT ROBERTS (R-KS)
U.S. SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL)
U.S. SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS (R-ME)
U.S. SENATOR JOHN ENSIGN (R-NV)
U.S. SENATOR JIM TALENT (R-MO)
U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)
U.S. SENATOR LINDSEY O. GRAHAM (R-SC)
U.S. SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE (R-NC)
U.S. SENATOR JOHN CORNYN (R-TX)
U.S. SENATOR JOHN THUNE (R-SD)
U.S. SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI) RANKING MEMBER
U.S. SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-MA)
U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD (D-WV)
U.S. SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN (D-CT)
U.S. SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI)
U.S. SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA (D-HI)
U.S. SENATOR BILL NELSON (D-FL)
U.S. SENATOR BEN NELSON (D-NE)
U.S. SENATOR MARK DAYTON (D-MN)
U.S. SENATOR EVAN BAYH (D-IN)
U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)

WITNESSES:

ROBERT GATES, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NOMINEE
FORMER SENATOR ROBERT DOLE
FORMER SENATOR DAVID BOREN

[*]

WARNER: Good morning, everyone.

Dr. Gates I think I can safely say on behalf of the citizens of our country, we're very pleased that you have accepted another challenge, another chapter in public service, subject to the confirmation of the Senate.

So we're very pleased to have you before us this morning.

Dr. Gates has a long and distinguished record of service to the nation. After establishing a firm educational foundation at the College of William and Mary in the Commonwealth of Virginia, he served in the United States Air Force from 1966 through 1969.

Dr. Gates then joined the Central Intelligence Agency, where he spent over 26 years, a quarter of a century, as an intelligence professional; including a period of nearly nine years assigned to the National Security Council.

Dr. Gates has served as deputy director of the CIA from '86 to '89; subsequently as assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser from '89 until '91; then nominated by President George Herbert Walker Bush to be the 15th director of the CIA in June of 1991.

In September and October of '91, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under the leadership of Senator David Boren, who's joined us here this morning, and Senator Frank Murkowski conducted hearings on Dr. Gates' nomination.

The committee took the testimony of some 21 witnesses, compiled a record of over 2,500 pages of testimony, and favorably reported Dr. Gates' nomination to the full Senate.

November 15th, '91, Dr. Gates was confirmed by the Senate and served with distinction throughout the remainder of former President Bush's term.

During the Senate floor debate on Dr. Gates' nomination on November 4, '91, I complimented Senator Boren on the very thorough way in which you, as the chairman of that Intelligence Committee -- and I think I'm the only one remaining in the Senate who as on the committee at that time -- for what you did.

WARNER: And I stated on the floor, quote, "Bob Gates is a very thoughtful man, an honest man, an experienced official, a good analyst, a no-nonsense manager, and a man with a vision of the future direction of the role of U.S. intelligence," end quote.

I repeat those comments and stand by them this morning.

I would note that Dr. Gates' additional experience in government and the private sector since his departure from CIA in '93 and his continuing academic and scholarly pursuits have enhanced his qualifications to perform the duties of secretary of defense.

Dr. Gates, I'd like to address for a few moments the challenges that you will face if confirmed.

From 1969 to '74, I had the privilege of serving in the Department of Defense -- specifically, the Department of the Navy -- under three secretaries of defense. And, subsequently, I've had the opportunity to work as a member of this committee with each of the nine men who have followed that period.

Upon returning from my eighth visit to Iraq with my good friend and colleague -- the ranking member and the future chairman of this committee -- when we got back from Iraq in October of this year, I said the following at a press conference: Quote, "But I assure the country that in two or three months if this thing hasn't come to fruition and if this level of violence is not under control and if the government under Prime Minister Maliki is not able to function, then it's the responsibility of our government internally to determine: Is there a change of course that we should take? And I wouldn't take any option off the table," end quote.

WARNER: I further observed that the situation was drifting sideways. Regrettably, the levels of violence have continued to escalate in Iraq, and the ability of Prime Minister Maliki and his government to exercise fully the range of sovereignty remain an enormous challenge.

Yesterday, I was present at an open forum when General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was asked a question: "Are we winning the war?," end quote.

His response was as follows, and I quote him: "We're not winning, but we're not losing," end quote. There seems to me a parallel between what I said when I got back and that distinguished chairman's observation yesterday.

I commend the president who, for the past two months, has directed the appropriate Cabinet officers to perform a complete review of all issues relating to Iraq and Afghanistan and our future policies; and asked his able executive branch to apply their best judgment in determining the way ahead, specifically, in Iraq.

Further, he's met with and indicated that he looks forward to receiving the Baker-Hamilton report, which we here in Congress will receive tomorrow.

This committee has invited the members of the Iraq group to a hearing on -- 9:30 -- Thursday. As yet, I don't think, Senator Levin -- they haven't replied to our letter.

The Iraq Study Group of which you were a member will formally present its findings and recommendations.

WARNER: I commend the members of that group for their public service. I think it will be a very important contribution to this critical debate at this critical time in our history.

Additionally, General Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has his ongoing review. He does that pursuant to his statutory authority, exploring all options. And that is a continuing advisory role that he provides for the president; yourself, assuming you're confirmed as secretary of defense; and to the Congress.

Most importantly, however, the American people expressed their judgment on November 7th that change is needed. The president has responded and stated that he desires to obtain, quote, "fresh eyes," end quote, on the situation in Iraq. Your nomination is confirmation of the president's desire for that approach.

Our committee will continue to look at every option, as I conclude my chairmanship and the distinguished senator from Michigan assumes his.

After the president has had the opportunity to review these very important reports, I respectfully -- and I repeat, respectfully -- suggest to the administration that he privately consult with the bipartisan leadership of the new Congress, members who've responded to the mandate of the people, before making his final decisions.

It is my hope that the executive and legislative branches will formulate a bipartisan consensus on the way forward.

To me, this fulfills a moral obligation that our government -- executive and legislative -- has to the brave men and women of the armed forces of the United States and their families, who've sacrificed very, very heavily in this fight to preserve our freedom.

WARNER: Dr. Gates, let me remind you of your own words from your book, "From the Shadows," about the study of those who serve in the executive branch to keep the Congress informed in a timely and candid manner.

And I quote from that book: "I sat in the Situation Room in secret meetings for nearly 20 years under five presidents. All I can say is that some awful crazy schemes might well have been approved had everyone present not known and expected hard questions, debate and criticism from the Hill," end quote.

Secondly, from the same book, and I quote: "And when on a few occasions Congress was kept in the dark and such schemes did proceed, it was nearly always to the lasting regret of the presidents involved. Working with the Congress was never easy for presidents, but then, under the Constitution, it was not supposed to be easy. I saw too many in the White House forget that."

I urge you, my friend -- and we have been friends and acquaintances for these many years -- to pursue your responsibilities in a manner consistent with these salient observations as you undertake the duties of secretary of defense if confirmed.

You've been nominated for one of the most important positions in government. You will be an important part of the new review process in determining the strategy and the direction of this country, together with our partners in the coalition must pursue.

I urge you not to restrict your advice, your personal opinions regarding the current and future evaluations in these strategy discussions.

In short, you simply have to be fearless -- I repeat: fearless -- in discharging your statutory obligations as, quote, "the principal assistant to the president in all matters relating to the Department of Defense."

WARNER: Good luck.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Dr. Gates to the committee.

Dr. Gates, we appreciate your willingness to return to public life after more than a decade in what is supposed to be a quieter, academic area.

Sitting next to Senator Boren, who is also in that quiet academic area, I'm not sure I can accurately describe it as being that quiet, but we do welcome your willingness to return.

If confirmed as secretary of defense, Robert Gates will face the monumental challenge of picking up the pieces from broken policies and mistaken priorities in the past few years.

First and foremost, this means addressing the ongoing crisis in Iraq. The situation in Iraq has been getting steadily worse, not better. Before the invasion of Iraq, we failed to plan to provide an adequate force for the occupation of the country, or to plan for the aftermath of major combat operations.

After we toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, we thoughtlessly disbanded the Iraqi army and also disqualified tens of thousands of low-level Baath Party members from future government employment.

These actions contributed to the chaos and violence that followed, and to alienating substantial portions of the Iraqi population.

We have failed, so far, to secure the country and defeat the insurgency. And we have failed to disarm the militias and create a viable Iraqi military or police force.

LEVIN: And we have failed to rebuild the economic infrastructure of the country and provide employment for the majority of Iraqis.

The next secretary of defense will have to deal with the consequences of those failures. And Iraq is not the only challenge that you will face.

We're going to be faced by a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan; an unpredictable nuclear power in North Korea; an Iran that seems to be aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons and causing problems throughout the region; an Army and Marine Corps in need of tens of billions of dollars to replace and repair equipment that has been damaged and destroyed in the course of ongoing operations; the military's nondeployed ground forces that have a declining level of readiness to meet their wartime missions; weapons programs that, despite the expenditure of more than $100 billion a year, are increasingly unaffordable; a military that faces constant challenge in recruiting and retaining the troops that it needs; military families suffering from the increased strains of repeated deployments; and a sustained high operational tempo; and a department whose image has been tarnished by the mistreatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and elsewhere.

Despite these problems, the next secretary of defense will lead a military that is, by far, the most powerful in the world. Our Department of Defense not only has the most capable weapons systems ever deployed, we are blessed with an extraordinarily talented and committed military and civilian workforce.

LEVIN: Unfortunately, the department's effectiveness has been reduced by a civilian senior leadership that has too often not welcomed differing views, whether from our uniformed military leaders, the intelligence community, the State Department, American allies, or members of Congress of both political parties.

The next secretary will have to work hard to heal these wounds and address the many problems facing the department and the country. Success will require more than total commitment. It will require an individual who is creative, fair, and open-minded -- and, above all, an individual who can listen to, learn from and work with others.

It will also require an individual who is willing to speak truth to power and encourage others to do the same.

Among other things, that means ensuring that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is able, on his own behalf and on behalf of the other members of the Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders, to give unvarnished, direct military advice to the commander in chief.

The next secretary will not only need to respect the Goldwater- Nichols law, which assures that such advice will be given directly to the president and the National Security Council, he will also need to respect that advice himself.

It is no secret that I voted against Dr. Gates' nomination to be director of central intelligence in 1991. I did so because I thought that he had been less than candid about the role that he played in the Iran-Contra affair.

As I have said before, however, I, for one, intend to take a fresh and fair look at Dr. Gates' record.

LEVIN: In that regard, I find many of Dr. Gates' responses to the committee's pre-hearing policy questions to be reassuring.

For example, Dr. Gates stated that two lessons we should learn from the war in Iraq are that war-planning should be done with the understanding that the post-major-combat phase of operations is critical and that the intelligence community should not exaggerate its capabilities or minimize the uncertainty that plagues assessments.

In those pre-hearing responses, he also stated that there is no purely military solution in Iraq. He stated that we should not be afraid to engage in direct discussions with our adversaries, as we did, quote, "in the worst days of the Cold War, when the U.S. maintained a dialogue with the Soviet Union and China."

He has reassured the committee that the Department of Defense policies and actions relative to detainees must comply not only with the revised Army Field Manual on interrogations but also with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

Last but not least, Dr. Gates has said that he will cooperate with committee requests for information or documents and that he will comply with legislation requiring that known costs of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan be funded through the normal budget process rather than through emergency supplementals.

These are all reassuring statements that you have made to the committee.

I look forward to the testimony of our nominee. Again, I thank him for his willingness to leave a job that he loves to undertake a heavy and a demanding responsibility.

LEVIN: I also want to thank Senators Dole and Boren, who were such deeply respected members of this body and are such good friends of all of us, and whose endorsement of you, Dr. Gates, has significance for all of us.

Finally, this hearing has a special meaning for members of this committee, because it may well be Senator Warner's last hearing as chairman of this committee.

Senator Warner has always chaired this committee with unfailing fairness, dignity and civility, reflecting his passion for the security of this nation. His devotion to the well-being of our men and women in uniform who have dedicated their lives to the service of our country has been a hallmark of his chairmanship, as has the bipartisan way in which he has worked with all of us and our staffs. He has truly been one of the great chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I thank you.

WARNER: I thank you, Senator Levin, for those kind remarks.

And I thank each of my colleagues whom I've had the privilege to serve here these many years.

Twenty-eight years ago we came here together, and I pass the gavel to you in about a week or so. Good luck to you, my friend.

Senator Dole, you have been an absolute tower of strength in the institution of the United States Senate. And as you were the majority leader at one time, you have just a bare notch of seniority over our colleague Senator Boren...

(LAUGHTER)

... so we'll let you lead off.

(LAUGHTER)

R. DOLE: Now, Mr. Chairman, I'm almost -- I'm probably here accident, because the phone rang at home and I picked it up and the person on the other end said, "Senator Dole, would you mind introducing me at the hearing?" And I said, "Yes."

And I learned later they were calling for Elizabeth.

(LAUGHTER)

I appreciate the fact that she's on the committee, and I appreciate this opportunity. And it'll be very brief.

President John Adams once said, "If we do not lay out ourselves in the service of mankind, whom should we serve?"

Bob Gates truly understands this. Granted, I may be a little biased owing to his Kansas roots. It was Kansas where he first learned the meaning of service while growing up in Wichita. His appreciation for the interest of others grew as a student at William and Mary and throughout his years as a career intelligence official and through his subsequent leadership of our intelligence services -- and, most recently, in his stewardship of Texas A&M, one of our nation's outstanding universities.

Through it all, Bob Gates has given of himself in this great tradition to our nation and our people.

Mr. Chairman, as we convene, our nation's defense policy is dominated by a single issue: the war in Iraq. Even those critics of the war who want us to withdraw soon or cut our forces substantially acknowledge that the stakes are high.

I believe we can agree with our president, who has said this is a massive and difficult undertaking. It is worth our effort. It is worth our sacrifice, because we know the stakes.

R. DOLE: The failure of an Iraq democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region.

At this critical hour, Mr. Chairman, you and your committee have gathered for an exceedingly rare act, a confirmation of a new secretary of defense in wartime.

The last time this happened was in 1968, when President Johnson nominated Clark Clifford to replace Bob McNamara. Make no mistake about it: History is being made here today.

Today, Bob Gates is poised to take the helm at the Defense Department at a time of intense debate over the war.

Some contend that, with sufficient time and dedication, victory is assured. Yet there is no denying that, having overthrown Saddam Hussein, we have not secured the peace, that Iraq's borders remain porous, that the interests and destabilizing involvement of Iran and Syria have not been adequately addressed, and that the current power vacuum creates risk of an even larger-scale sectarian conflict.

At the same time, those who have been calling for withdrawal or massive date-certain drawdowns should acknowledge that these are tactical shifts, not a radical overhaul of our policies; that the removal of Saddam from power opened the door to democracy; and that to realize these are goals worthy of sacrifice and the defeat is not an option, for the quality of life in many parts of the country is better than it was four years ago.

In the American experience, wars that enjoy equivocal support from our people usually end with equivocal outcomes. This is why our country must unite behind a strategy for a successful military mission, a viable exit plan, and a recognizable vision for Iraq's future.

B. DOLE: I agree with the president that Bob Gates is the man to make this happen. He is a person of uncommon resolve, intellect, and strength of character. He has the force of will to exercise civilian control over the military, but be sensitive to respect the wisdom and counsel of our generals and admirals and the men and women who serve under them.

A famous Kansan, Dwight Eisenhower, once said of General George C. Marshall that he typified all that we call on or that we look for in what we call an American patriot. The same may be said of Bob Gates. And it is my honor to introduce him formally to this committee and urge you not only to confirm him as our next secretary of defense, but also to give him your full support in the difficult days and months ahead.

Thank you and God bless America.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator Dole. You've had a long and distinguished career, beginning as a combat soldier and platoon leader in the closing months of World War II. We have the highest regard for your contributions here this morning.

Senator Boren, a former chairman of the Intelligence Committee at the time that this fine American came before us, we're delighted to have you and to have you return to the Senate.

BOREN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for allowing me the privilege to join with my colleague, Senator Bob Dole, to present Dr. Robert Gates, the president's nominee for secretary of defense.

Mr. Chairman, members, I also have a statement with me of former Senator Nunn, the former distinguished chairman of this committee, that he asked that I submit along with my own statement. It's a strong statement of endorsement of the nomination of Dr. Gates.

WARNER: Without objection, so admitted.

BOREN: Mr. Chairman, and members, I sincerely believe that at this critical moment Dr. Gates is the best possible choice for this position. In my entire adult lifetime, our country has never been faced with more dangerous challenges.

With only 6 percent of the world's population, we face economic growth in other nations and regions which are likely to bring them into them economic parity with the United States in a relative short time -- and military parity, as well, if they decide to use their resources for that purpose.

BOREN: We are militarily spread thin in areas of the world where serious threats exist. And there are no easy options for extricating ourselves from our military involvement in Iraq.

At the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, we also faced threats that could've overwhelmed us. How we responded then provides us with an excellent guide for the present.

First, we brought together people of exceptional talent, like Bob Gates, to serve us without regard to political party affiliation.

Second, leaders like President Truman, a Democrat, and Senator Vandenberg, a Republican, adopted a truly bipartisan blueprint that provided us with a consistent policy for over 40 years without regard to which party controlled the White House or the Congress.

Third, we did not bear all of the burdens of leadership by ourselves. We formed strong alliances and partnerships with other nations based upon mutual respect. We struck the right balance between diplomacy, dialogue and military strength. We made sure that we were always strong enough to act alone if we had to do so, but we were wise enough to avoid that situation.

We must do exactly the same thing now. Partisan polarization, if allowed to continue, will destroy our economic, military, social and moral influence in the world, and it will ultimately destroy the fabric of our own country itself.

During his 26 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency and at the National Security Council, Bob Gates demonstrated his sincere commitment to bipartisanship.

BOREN: He served as deputy director and director of the CIA under Republican presidents with Democratic majorities in both houses of the Congress.

During the six years that I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee, I watched him effectively work to build a consensus on sensitive issues. Democrats and Republicans had equal seats at the table.

During these six years, in no small part because of his bipartisan spirit and his respect for the oversight and policy-making role of Congress, our committee, as you will remember, Mr. Chairman, had only a tiny handful of roll-call votes. And not one of them was even close.

We simply worked with each other and with the executive branch, often represented by Dr. Gates, until a consensus was reached. I came to respect Bob Gates as a realist who faced up to the facts and adjusted to changing situations.

He rejected inflexible ideological positions and worked hard to fashion practical solutions. We badly need those qualities right now.

Most recently, as a fellow university president, I have watched with admiration his leadership in bringing faculty members, students and alumni together to increase the strength and diversity of Texas A&M, where he serves as president.

Bob Gates knows how to lead large and complex organizations. He will hit the ground running as secretary of defense, at a moment when we have no time to waste.

But I am here today not only because I believe that Bob Gates has exceptional ability, but also because I have confidence in his personal integrity and in his sincere desire to serve our country.

BOREN: It was my responsibility to chair the hearings which resulted in his confirmation to serve as director of the Central Intelligence Agency which have been referenced.

His nomination came to our committee on June 24th, 1991. Our scrutiny of this nominee was not completed until October 18th of that year. All the questions which were raised, even those of doubtful credibility, were vigorously pursued.

Part of the final committee reports reads as follows, and I quote it: "By any standard, the consideration of this nomination was the most thorough and comprehensive of any nomination ever received by the committee."

Thousands of documents were reviewed. Hundreds of witnesses were interviewed by the committee staff. The nominee testified for four long days in open and closed sessions responding to almost 900 questions. And written responses were submitted to an almost additional 100 questions.

In short, these thorough proceedings confirmed the commitment of Bob Gates to faithful and honorable public service.

Today we have an opportunity to embark upon a new bipartisan path to protect our national security. The Senate can do its part by quickly and overwhelmingly confirming this talented nominee as secretary of defense.

But confirmation alone is not sufficient. The president must also do his part by making sure that he gives great weight to the bipartisan spirit and realistic advice which I believe that he will receive from Dr. Robert Gates.

There are those who say it is an impractical and romantic idea that we can replace polarization with civility, cooperation and partnership. To the doubters, I answer that we achieved it in the Senate Intelligence Committee with the help of Bob Gates only 15 years ago. It is not only an option we can achieve with hard work and determination, it is imperative if the United States is to remain the world leader.

And it is for that reason that it is an honor for me to recommend to this committee the confirmation of Dr. Robert Gates.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Boren.

We here on this committee are faced with the reality that we have but a few days in this session. And I think it's in the interest of our nation that we complete our work as a committee, as a Senate, on the advice and consent role trusted to this institution under the Constitution.

It is my intention -- and I have been in consultation with the distinguished ranking member -- that we will hold this hearing throughout this day. As the afternoon approaches, I would hope that the members of this committee would advise the two leaders here of their own commitments and desires. But it is our expectation that, before day's end, we can complete this hearing.

If not, we'll resume tomorrow. But I would urge that we try and complete it today.

We will also have an executive session today, which is important to examine the nominee in the confines of classified material.

So with that in mind, we thank both of our distinguished colleagues for joining us this morning.

And, Dr. Gates, before we proceed to hear from you, I would ask the indulgence of the committee -- a quorum now be present -- we discharge our other constitutional function; i.e. confirming the 1,023 pending military nominations.

All of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. No objections have been raised to these nominations.

Do I hear a motion to favorably report the nominations?

LEVIN: So moved.

WARNER: Is there a second? All in favor say, "Aye." Opposed? Ayes have it.

WARNER: Second nominees -- I ask the committee to consider the nominations of Scott W. Stucky and Margaret A. Ryan to be judges on the United States court of appeals for the armed forces. Yesterday Senator Levin and I conducted a hearing on the nominations, and no objections have been raised to these nominations.

Do I hear a motion that these two nominations be voted on en bloc?

LEVIN: So moved.

WARNER: Second? All in favor, say, "Aye." Opposed? Ayes have it.

Thank you very much.

Now, Dr. Gates, we're pleased to have your opening comments.

GATES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor to come before you today for this confirmation hearing. I'm also deeply honored by and grateful to the president for his confidence and trust in nominating for secretary of defense.

I want to express my sincere thanks to both Chairman Warner and incoming Chairman Levin for their speedy consideration of this nomination. Both of you have been exceedingly gracious to me during my courtesy calls.

I've long been impressed by the experience and collective wisdom of this committee. I'm also all too aware that secretaries come and go but the Senate Armed Services Committee remains. If confirmed, I will seek your counsel and take it seriously.

I want to thank my good friends and former senators, Bob Dole and David Boren, for introducing me this morning and for their kind remarks.

I'm also grateful to the former long-term chairman of this committee, Senator Nunn, for his introductory words of support.

I'd also like to note that I first came before the Senate for confirmation more than 20 years ago, in April 1986. And on that occasion and twice more, the chairman of this committee, Senator Warner, introduced me. I will always be grateful for his kindness and courtesy.

WARNER: I thank the nominee.

GATES: I would be remiss if I also did not thank my wife of 40 years, Becky, and our two children, Eleanor and Brad, for their infinite patience as I contemplate a return to Washington.

Becky asked to be excused today to accompany the Texas A&M women's basketball team to an away game in Seattle.

The Department of Defense, in peacetime and in wartime, always faces multiple challenges, many of which were identified in the questions the committee asked me to answer.

If I am confirmed by the Senate, I will do my best to bring progress in addressing as many of these challenges as possible.

At the same time, I am under no illusion why I am sitting before you today: the war in Iraq. Addressing the challenges we face in Iraq must and will be my highest priority, if confirmed.

I welcome the many alternative strategies and tactics proposed by members of Congress and others. More are coming, most notably from the Iraq Study Group, of which I was a member until November 8; led by former Congressman Lee Hamilton and former Secretary of State James Baker.

Other reviews are ongoing within the Department of Defense and elsewhere in government.

I am open to a wide range of ideas and proposals. If confirmed, I plan, urgently, to consult with our military leaders and our combat commanders in the field, as well as with others in the executive branch and in Congress.

I would then sit down with the president and members of the National Security Council to discuss the situation in Iraq and offer my thoughts and recommendations. I will give most serious consideration to the views of those who lead our men and women in uniform.

GATES: And, of course, it is the president who will decide what, if any, changes are made in our approach.

While I am open to alternative ideas about our future strategy and tactics in Iraq, I feel quite strongly about one point: Developments in Iraq over the next year or two will, I believe, shape the entire Middle East and greatly influence global geo-politics for many years to come.

Our course over the next year or two will determine whether the American and Iraqi people and the next president of the United States will face a slowly but steadily improving situation in Iraq and in the region or will face the very real risk and possible reality of a regional conflagration.

We need to work together to develop a strategy that does not leave Iraq in chaos and that protects our long-term interests in and hopes for the region.

I did not seek this position or a return to government. I'm here because I love my country and because the president of the United States believes I can help in a difficult time.

I hope you will reach a similar conclusion.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, perhaps the most humbling part of the position for which this committee is considering me, is knowing that my decisions will have life-and-death consequences.

Our country is at war and, if confirmed, I will be charged with leading the men and women who are fighting it. The patriots who have volunteered to serve in our armed services today have no equal in the world and are in the long tradition of their forbearers who have fought our country's wars for the last 230 years.

I offer this committee my solemn commitment to keep the welfare of our forces upper most in my mind.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my opening remarks.

WARNER: Thank you, Dr. Gates.

I'll now proceed to question you with regard to the standard procedures this committee has with regard to all nominations.

The committee asked Dr. Gates to answer a series of advance policy questions.

WARNER: He's responded to those questions. Without objection, I'll make the questions a part of the record.

Now, to the standard questions -- if you will respond to each question, we'll proceed.

Have you adhered to all applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of interest?

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

GATES: No, sir.

WARNER: Will you ensure that your staff, if confirmed, will have deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Meet those requests?

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to the committees of the Congress of the United States?

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or their briefings?

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Do you agree that, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee of the Congress or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

GATES: Yes, sir; to the limits of my authority.

BYRD: Mr. Chairman, I didn't hear that answer.

WARNER: Fine. I'll repeat the question and we'll have the answer. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner, when requested by a duly constituted committee of the Congress?

GATES: Yes, sir; to the extent of my authority.

WARNER: Fine. Or if you desire, consult with the committee regarding any basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Thank you.

We'll now have our six-minute round of questions.

I would start off with the following: The president, in the past two months, as the various studies are being undertaken about an analysis of our future course of action in Iraq -- studies by, internally, the administration, Baker group, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and others.

But at a number of opportunities he's made it very clear -- and I will read his quote as follows. President Bush said, "I know there's a lot of speculation that these reports in Washington mean that there's going to be some kind of graceful exit out of Iraq. We're going to stay in Iraq to get the job done as long as the government wants us" -- that's the government of Iraq -- "wants us there." Added a statement to the effect of, "We're going to stay until the mission is completed."

Now, we have to assume that you've had a number of consultations with the president to determine exactly what his desires are, with regard to the mission being completed, and what your understanding of those desires and your own -- your own -- approach, as best you can make it at this time without the benefit of having all of the studies before you.

But the question I have is: Did you understand fully what's in the mind of the president when he said, "We're going to stay in Iraq until the mission is completed"?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I have the sense that the president's view of accomplishing the mission, at this point, is an Iraq that can defend itself, can sustain itself and can govern itself.

I also believe that he understands that there needs to be a change in our approach in Iraq; that what we are doing now is not working satisfactorily.

When he asked me to take this job, as he put it, he wanted someone with fresh eyes to look at the situation and make recommendations.

In my view, all options are on the table, in terms of how we address this problem in Iraq, in terms of how we can be more successful and how we can, at some point, begin to draw down our forces.

So, I guess, the bottom line is that I believe that he wants me to take a fresh look and that all options are on the table.

WARNER: And at this juncture, in your working with the president, you're comfortable that the two of you can perform this arduous task, not just this phase of such change of strategies it may take, but evolutions that could occur in the months to come?

GATES: Yes, sir, I am.

WARNER: On the question of the command and control of the U.S. forces in Iraq and command and control of the Iraqi forces, Iraq, as you well know, is now a sovereign nation.

WARNER: That sovereignty was given to Iraq by the sacrifices of the men and women of the armed forces of our nation and other nations that fought courageously to enable them to have their elections, establish their government and begin to exercise the reins of sovereignty.

But an incident in October involving orders from Prime Minister Maliki to abandon checkpoints around Baghdad concerned me and I think many others. The issue is command and control of the U.S. forces.

Now, our forces had taken risks, indeed perhaps in some instances loss of life and limb, in establishing the progress thus far that we've made in Baghdad.

Several months ago the military officers came before this committee and said Baghdad is the battle that we must win and we're going to put considerable emphasis on that battle. And to date I think they would acknowledge the goals that they had originally established in their minds, the timetable that they originally, has not been met.

But this was a very interesting chapter of command and control, when our forces took those checkpoints, presumably at the direction of our commanders, and that direction presumably was in consultation in some measure with the Iraqi government. And then the prime minister appeared to be -- unilaterally said, "Take those forces back down out of those checkpoints."

It related directly to Sadr and his forces and indeed that area referred to as Sadr City.

What is your understanding of how this command and control is working today and how it will work in the future?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I'm only aware of that incident by virtue of what I've read in the newspaper, and so I'm not familiar with the particulars.

GATES: I think that that would be a question that I would want to address with General Casey early on to see if he is content with the command and control arrangements and what changes he thinks need to be made, if any, in the arrangements that we have with the Iraqis.

Clearly, as we ask the Iraqis to stand up, they are going to want to stand up by themselves increasingly. We want Iraq to have a sovereign government.

But as long as American men and women are putting their lives at risk, clearly the command and control of those forces is very important. And I would take it as an early priority to get an understanding with General Casey about his concerns, if he has any, about those arrangements.

WARNER: And that requires a very clear and precise understanding, because the men and women of the United States armed forces -- and I think we can speak for the other coalition, they've got to be responsible to the respective heads of their government and, in our instance, the president of the United States.

To the director of national intelligence and your relation, assuming you're confirmed as secretary of defense, during the debate over the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, you expressed concern about the proper balancing of authorities and responsibilities among the major elements of the intelligence community. You believed that the legislation enacted struck a correct balance.

In what areas will you consider to strengthen the working relationships between the DNI and the director of CIA and the secretary of defense?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I think that the legislation addressed -- the final legislation addressed some of the concerns that I had had with the establishment of the director of national intelligence position.

GATES: I would have to tell you I remain concerned that the law charges the director of national intelligence with the execution of the national foreign intelligence program, and also with other things, such as ensuring that members of the intelligence community obey the law.

But the director of national intelligence cannot personally hire or fire the heads of a single intelligence agency in the United States government.

And as somebody who's led very large organizations, without having that authority, it makes it very difficult to exercise your will; especially if you're trying to change cultures.

So I would anticipate, if confirmed, working with the director of national intelligence to see if there are ways in which we can work together to ensure that he has the authority that he needs to fulfill his responsibilities.

WARNER: And if there's a view that the legislation's required, will you promptly, in consultation with the president, bring that legislation to the Congress?

GATES: Yes, sir. I think that we can probably solve the problem without legislation. But should legislation be needed, I certainly would work with this committee and the Intelligence Committees.

WARNER: Thank you.

Senator Levin?

LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gates, do you believe that we are currently winning in Iraq?

GATES: No, sir.

LEVIN: Prime Minister Maliki said on November 27th that the, quote, "Crisis is political," and that, "We need to communicate a sense of urgency to the Iraqis." Excuse me. Excuse me. Let me start over again.

Prime Minister Maliki said on November 27th that, quote, "The crisis is political and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and blood-letting of innocents are the Iraqi politicians."

LEVIN: Do you believe that the end to violence in Iraq requires a political settlement and that we need to communicate a sense of urgency to the Iraqis to pressure them to reach a settlement that only their politicians can reach?

GATES: Yes, sir, I do.

LEVIN: Now, the chairman has asked you about a comment of the president that we are going to stay in Iraq as long as the Iraqis ask us to be there. There was something else added to that which the chairman asked you about, but I'm going to ask you about that statement of the president, which he's made twice in recent weeks: "We are going to stay in Iraq as long as the Iraqis ask us to be there."

Doesn't such an open-ended commitment send a message to the Iraqis that somehow or other it is our responsibility as to whether or not they achieve a nation, rather than it is their responsibility to reach a political settlement?

GATES: Senator, I haven't spoken with the president about those remarks, so I'm going to have to interpret them myself.

It seems to me that the United States is going to have to have some presence in Iraq for a long time. The Iraqi forces clearly have no logistical capability of their own; they have no air power of their own.

GATES: So the United States clearly, even if our -- if whatever changed approached or strategy we come up with, the president implements, works, we are still going to have to have some level of American support therefore for the Iraqi military. And that could take quite some time. But it could be with a dramatically smaller number of U.S. forces than are there today.

And so I would interpret the president's remarks in this vein: that we are willing to continue to help the Iraqis as long as they want our help. I don't think that it implies that we will be there at the level of force we have or doing the things that we are doing in a major combat way for the indefinite future.

LEVIN: Secretary Rumsfeld in a memo that was recently published outlined options that the president should consider relative to Iraq. Some of the options were above the line, as he put it, and some were below the line. The ones above the line he basically felt were worthy of consideration, the ones below the line he did not think were worthy of consideration.

Two of the options above the line were the following: begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and coalition forces so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

Do you believe that option is worthy of consideration?

GATES: Yes, sir. As I indicated, I think that all options are on the table.

LEVIN: As you know, Dr. Gates, former secretary of state George Shultz wrote a book in which he was critical of you when you were the director -- the deputy director, more accurately, deputy director of central intelligence. And he said that he told you the following: that "I don't have any confidence in the intelligence community."

LEVIN: "I feel you all have very strong policy views. I wouldn't trust anything you guys said about Iran, no matter what. I feel you try to manipulate me. You deal out intelligence as you deem appropriate. I feel an effort is made to manipulate me by the selection of material that you send my way."

Would you comment, now, on those remarks, or those written comments of Secretary Schultz, addressed comments that he said he addressed to you when you were William Casey's deputy at the CIA?

GATES: Yes, sir. It's a significant question, and I think that it deserves a detailed response.

First, let me say that I believe George Schultz is one of the greatest secretaries of state in American history. I would also tell you that he was probably one of the best and most avid users of American intelligence of any senior official I worked with in my entire career. And I have a very high regard for him.

The reality is that I think Secretary Schultz's views of intelligence were influenced, in no small measure, by his personal relationship with Director Casey.

It was an open secret in Washington that the two didn't get along. Casey was perceived as having his own independent foreign policy that he pursued independent of the secretary of state.

He was perceived as not differentiating, in meetings, between his personal opinions and the views of the CIA's experts. He consistently tried to give advice to the secretary of state on how to do his job, which I'm sure was not appreciated.

And finally, in the fall of 1986, Director Casey wrote the president of the United States and recommended that the secretary of state be fired.

So I think it's fair to say that they did not have a warm personal relationship. And I think that bad blood, frankly, influenced Secretary Schultz's view of intelligence.

I would tell you that I had a dialogue with Secretary of State Schultz, over a six-year period, on the quality of intelligence and the support that we gave him. And frankly, the relationship was much more positive in real-time than he portrays it in his book.

He drew heavily on CIA for intelligence relating to arms control verification, developments in the Soviet Union, the Pakistani nuclear program, a variety of negotiations he was involved in.

He was -- as I said at the outset, he was a very avid user of intelligence information.

At the same time, in this dialogue -- and we would meet almost weekly -- he told me that he felt that CIA was too pessimistic about too many issues, El Salvador, Lebanon, Angola, and various others, from one time to another.

GATES: And we disagreed on developments in the Soviet Union. Sometimes he was right; sometimes we were right. Sometimes we were wrong also.

I think that there was a high correlation, frankly, between his criticism of the intelligence and when the intelligence was focused on issues in which he was engaged in negotiations; and particularly when that intelligence analysis provided ammunition to his critics inside the administration or here on the Hill or where he felt they complicated his negotiations.

From a personal standpoint, he was always friendly to me. As I said, we met frequently throughout that six-year period. And I would tell you that I do not recall him at any time during that six years ever questioning my personal integrity or saying that I personally was manipulating the intelligence.

We would have big meetings and we would have small meetings. And in the small meetings, for example, on Angola, he was convinced the CIA was trying to manipulate the intelligence on Angola. And I kept trying to persuade him that what he was getting was the unvarnished views of the intelligence analysts and CIA and that Casey hadn't seen anything that he was receiving in terms of the analysis on Angola. But I think he remained skeptical.

So we had this dialogue for a long time. I think, as I suggest, his views in his memoir, frankly, were much starker and much more negative than the working relationship that we and other intelligence analysts from CIA had with him at the time.

LEVIN: Thank you, Dr. Gates. Your acknowledgement that we're not winning in Iraq, frankly, is a necessary, refreshing breath of reality that is so needed if we're going to look at ways of changing course in Iraq to maximize the chances of success. I thank you for that and the other candid responses that you've given here.

My time is up.

WARNER: Senator McCain?

MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Gates, thank you for your willingness to serve this nation again. We're very grateful. We know you left a very comfortable life in Texas to serve this nation again, and we are grateful. And I would like to offer my congratulations and condolences for your appointment.

I'd like to follow on just what Senator Levin said. We are not winning the war in Iraq; is that correct?

GATES: That is my view -- yes, sir.

MCCAIN: And, therefore, status quo is not acceptable?

GATES: That is correct, sir.

MCCAIN: I know you did a great deal of work with the Iraq Study Group, and there is a general consensus of opinion now, in hindsight, that we didn't have sufficient number of troops at the time of the invasion to control Iraq -- either Anbar Province, the looting, most importantly the weapons and ammunition depots that were looted at the time.

When anarchy prevails, it's very difficult to gain control of a country.

Do you agree that, at the time of the invasion, we didn't have sufficient troops to control the country, in hindsight?

GATES: Well, I had to deal with hindsight in some of the decisions that I've made, Senator McCain, and sometimes it's not very comfortable.

I suspect, in hindsight, some of the folks in the administration probably would not make the same decisions that they made.

GATES: And I think one of those is that there clearly were insufficient troops in Iraq after the initial invasion to establish control over the country.

MCCAIN: And yet, at this particular point in time, when the suggestion is made, as the situation deteriorates and the status quo is not acceptable, that we reduce troops or, as General Abizaid said, that he had sufficient number of troops, in your study, when did we reach the point where we went from not having enough troops to having sufficient number of troops as the situation -- boots on the ground -- as the situation deteriorated?

That's a non sequitur that I have yet found to -- I'm unable to intellectually embrace.

GATES: Senator, I was a part of the Iraq Study Group during their education phase, I would say, and I resigned before they began their deliberations.

I would tell you that when we were in Iraq that we inquired of the commanders whether they had enough troops and whether a significant increase might be necessary. And I would say that the answer we received was that they thought they had adequate troops.

It seems to me that, as one considers all of the different options, in terms of a change of approach in Iraq and a change in tactics, that inquiring about this again is clearly something -- and it may be that a secretary of defense might get a more candid answer than an outside study group that was visiting them.

GATES: But we certainly -- the response that we received in Baghdad was that they had enough troops.

MCCAIN: Then the second and third questions should have been asked, and that is: Why is the conditions and situation continuing to deteriorate and not improve, if you have sufficient assets and people in order to get the job done -- which we now agree is not satisfactory?

One of the reasons given is it would be too great a strain on the military today; that we don't have sufficient active duty and Guard forces.

There were some of us, three and a half years ago, that said we needed to increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps. And the answer was: Well, that would take a couple of years.

Well, years have passed, and we still haven't got -- and we're still putting an enormous strain on the active duty and Guard forces.

Do you believe that we need to increase the size of the Marine Corps and the Army?

GATES: Senator, if I'm confirmed, I'm very open to the possibility and the necessity of an increase in the end-strength of the Army.

However, first, because we have 150,000 troops in the field, and we have a regular Army of about a half a million, and a Guard and Reserve of about another half a million, I would like to, if I'm confirmed, to first of all ensure for myself that the other 350,000 troops in the regular Army are doing what we want them to be doing and that they are all needed in the roles that they are in as a way of making sure that before we increase the end strength that we're using the strength we have in the way we ought to be.

GATES: But if the answer to that question is that's about the way it ought to be, that those troops are deployed in the way we want them deployed, then I'm very open to the possibility of an increase in the end strength.

MCCAIN: Well, again, I think when you look at -- we are living in a very dangerous world, whether you look at Iran, North Korea, the crisis in Lebanon as we speak -- the list goes on and on -- it'd be very difficult for us to envision us being capable of handling another contingency, given the fact that our military leaders are saying it would be too great a strain on the military and the Guard even to put additional troops into Iraq.

I hope you'll look at it very seriously.

Mr. Secretary, finally, General Zinni, who is highly respected by this committee, who was former head of the CENTCOM, who was speaking of Prime Minister Maliki, said, quote: "You can't put pressure on a wounded guy. There's a premise that the Iraqis are not doing enough now, that there's a capability that they've not employed or used. I'm not so sure they are capable of stopping sectarian violence."

Dr. Gates, I don't think they're capable either. And I think political solutions are breed by stability. And if you have military instability, it's very hard to come up with a political solution.

And just about everybody I know who looks at these plans for partition, for withdrawal to bases outside of Iraq or bases inside of Iraq believe that a chaotic situation would ensue.

I think this is -- I agree with most expert that this is our last chance to save this situation. And unless we stabilize conditions on the ground, I think it's going to be very difficult to get the kind of political solution that all of us seek.

Recently, I saw this proposal to move the Marines out of Anbar Province into Baghdad.

MCCAIN: What do we say to the families of those young people who died in the first and second battle of Fallujah when we abandon it to terrorist organizations again?

I wish you every success. I know that all of us on this committee and in this country have nothing but the interests of our nation's security and the men and women who serve it as our highest priority.

And I hope you will help us gain consensus so that, as a nation, we can move forward and make sure that the American people are not subjected to more sacrifice as a result of the failures that we've experienced in the past in this conflict.

And again, I thank you for serving, Doctor.

WARNER: Senator Kennedy?

KENNEDY: Thank you very much.

And, Dr. Gates, I join those in thanking you for your public service, your willingness to come back in and deal with this challenge that we're facing now on national security, defense, and primarily the issue of Iraq. And I'm grateful for the time that we had talking in our office.

And you're going to, obviously, get a good deal of difference guidance and advice here this morning.

But just to really pick up on a sentiment that Senator McCain caught, we have lost 60 soldiers in my state of Massachusetts. I've talked with just about every one of them. And they're really interested in hearing from you about whether you're going to be an independent figure that's really going to fight for the best in terms of our security as we find our security today.

We know, since you have been nominated now -- 59 Americans have been killed just in the 27 days since you've been nominated.

KENNEDY: In the 27 days just prior to that, 92 Americans were killed. And in the 27 days prior to that, 81 Americans were killed.

We don't know in the 27 days prior to the first of the year, when we're going to have these, evidently, decisions and judgments and a new policy, how many more Americans are killed.

And the people, the families, in my state want to know whether you're going to be that figure that Senator Warner talked about, that fearless champion of the service men and women that is going to be consistent with our national security.

These families know they were undermanned when they went into Iraq and they were underarmored when they went into Iraq. And they know that the military has served in Iraq longer than they have in World War II -- longer than World War II. They've done everything that they've been asked to do, and they've done it brilliantly, with extraordinary courage and valor.

And what the families want is to make sure that we're going to have a policy that is worthy of their valor and their bravery. And they're looking at you. And that's what they want, for you to make that recommendation, and that you'll be fearless in your battle, you'll be a stand-up person and demonstrate the kind of courage which is going to be so necessary to do.

KENNEDY: Could you just let them know that you're that person ready to do it for our national security and for them?

GATES: Senator Kennedy, 12 graduates of Texas A&M have been killed in Iraq. I would run in the morning with some of those kids, I'd have lunch with them, they'd share with me their aspirations and their hopes. And I'd hand them their degrees, I'd attend their commissioning, and then I would get word of their death.

So this all comes down to being very personal for all of us.

The statistics, 2,889 killed in Iraq as of yesterday morning: That's a big number, but every single one of them represents not only an individual tragedy for the soldier who has been killed, but for their entire family and their friends. And I see this.

Somebody asked me about the pressures of this hearing and I said the pressures of the hearing are nothing compared to the pressures I got from a woman who came over to me at the hotel while I was having dinner the other night, seated by myself, and she asked if I was Mr. Gates. And I said yes. She congratulated me on my nomination and she said, "I have two sons in Iraq. For God's sake, bring them home safe. And we'll be praying for you."

Now, that's real pressure.

Senator, I am not giving up the presidency of Texas A&M, the job that I've probably enjoyed more than any that I have ever had, making considerable personal financial sacrifice, and, frankly, going through this process, to come back to Washington to be a bump on a log and not to say exactly what I think, and to speak candidly and, frankly, boldly to people at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue about what I believe and what I think needs to be done.

GATES: I intend to listen closely to people. I intend to draw my own conclusions. And I'll make my recommendations.

But I can assure you that I don't owe anybody anything. And I'm coming back here to do the best I can for the men and women in uniform and for the country, in terms of these difficult problems that we face.

KENNEDY: Let me just, in the short time remaining, thank you for your answer.

But you'll hear, perhaps, from others, but I want to give you just one more chance to respond to the statements about what good would your new eyes do when we have had the commander, who, as has been mentioned, has said this in the last one month: "We've got a strategy for victory that will work. I truly believe the only way we won't win is if we leave before the job is done"?

As the chairman and Senator Levin pointed out, the quotes, "There's one thing I'm not going to do. I'm not going to pull the troops off the battlefield before the mission is complete."

"We're going to stay in Iraq to get the job done so long as the government wants us there."

"This business about a graceful exit just simply has no realism to it all."

Now, in short, should we believe you or the president on the critical issue whether the administration is really willing to make a change in its policy?

GATES: Senator, I'm willing to commit that, if I'm confirmed, I will be independent, that I will consider all of the options.

GATES: But, as I indicated in my opening statement, there is still only one president of the United States, and he will make the final decision.

KENNEDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much.

WARNER: Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There's been a lot of talk about the failures and the bad things that are going on, but I had occasion, Dr. Gates, to be in the AOR over there 12 different times. And every time I go over I see some of the successes.

And I see that, while there were three terrorist training camps in Iraq, they're not there anymore. The mass graves -- and I looked down in those -- that's not taking place anymore. The Iraq security forces and their embedded training has worked.

And I appreciate Senator Dole, in his introduction of you, talking about the fact that it's an overthrow of Saddam Hussein. I mean, here's somebody who had to be overthrown. He said things are better now than they were four years ago.

You were asked the question: Are we winning in Iraq? General Pace was asked that question yesterday. He said, "No, we're not winning, but we're not losing."

Do you agree with General Pace?

GATES: Yes, sir, at this point.

INHOFE: Dr. Gates, this morning in The Washington Post was an article that was about the reset problem that we have.

And I've had occasion to go to all of these Army logistics centers, and I've seen the rows of the equipment that is not getting out; the money's not there.

Last year we had to put an additional, I think, $23.8 billion into that program. And so that is a serious problem.

INHOFE: Now, when we're faced with these things and faced with choices that we have to make, one of the targets is often the Future Combat System of the United States Army. I don't know how familiar you are with that program, but, because that's something that is not bleeding today, that's where a lot of people want to take money out of.

And, yet, we are so far behind in different elements of our modernization program in the Army. For example, the NLOS Cannon Program, where the best thing we've got is the Paladin World War II technology; you have to swab the breach after every shot.

I would like to know what your commitment is to the Future Combat System and how you view that.

GATES: I think it's very important, Senator.

And I would say that I've not had the opportunity to get briefed in any detail on it or to evaluate any of the tradeoffs that are being made in the budget. I would anticipate that, if confirmed, I would have to take a look at those things and see what the budgetary situation is and also seek the views of members of the committee and other...

INHOFE: You would do that, seek our views on this, those of us who have been faced with this...

GATES: Yes, sir.

INHOFE: ... what I consider to be a crisis?

In 2000, we formed the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission, and it's usually referred to as the U.S.-China Commission. They have come out with five reports. This is the fifth report that just came out. I've been disturbed that no one seems to care about these. They don't seem to read these and understand what's in them.

I have a couple questions about that I want to ask you.

INHOFE: But I am concerned about China, and I'd like to hear what your thoughts are. Just in the last month the Chinese hackers, as you, I'm sure, have read, have shut down the e-mail and official computer work at the Naval War College. This is referred to by this commission as the Titan Rain.

In September, the Department of Commerce experienced a massive shutdown of its computer system.

This goes on and on. In July, the State Department acknowledged that Chinese attacks had broken into systems overseas and in Washington. Recently, China has used lasers to blind our satellites.

On October 26th, a Song-class Chinese submarine surfaced near the USS Kitty Hawk. They'd be following them undetected for a long period of time.

I've had occasion to spend quite a bit of time in Africa, and I noticed that China's presence in Africa, particularly in those states around the Sea of Guinea and where they have great oil reserves, is there, and they are way ahead of us. It happens that China and the United States are the two countries that depend on foreign sources of oil more than any of the other countries.

As this continues, I'd like to ask you what your feeling is about this as a top priority, about how you view China, about whether or not you have read these reports, and if not, if you would or you plan to do that, and if you agree with some of that which you have heard coming out in these reports.

GATES: Yes, sir. I have not read the reports.

INHOFE: And I would also say that we watched this as we were drawing down in the 1990s. They increased their military procurement by over 1,000 percent.

INHOFE: So this is a great concern.

Go ahead.

GATES: Yes, sir. I have not read the reports. I would be more than willing to do so. I've been aware, just from reading in the newspapers, it's been a number of years since I received any classified intelligence on what the Chinese were up to.

But it's been my impression that they've had a very aggressive intelligence-gathering effort against the United States.

Some of these other things that you've mentioned, this is the first time I've heard about that. And clearly, if confirmed, this would be something that I would want to get well-informed on.

INHOFE: And that's all I'd ask of you at this time because, after each report's come out, I've actually given speeches on the Senate floor only to find that people are not aware of how serious this is.

So if you'd make that commitment, to become familiar with in, and particularly in the reports that this fine commission has done, I would appreciate that very much.

I have often said that, in spite of the successes and failures that have taken place in that most difficult area over there, that the people that we have in charge, General Abizaid, General Casey, General Chiarelli, General Pace, I can't think of a team -- militarily speaking -- that is any better that we could have drawn upon than this team.

Do you agree with that?

GATES: They seem to me to be very fine officers, sir.

INHOFE: I appreciate that.

And finally, my time is up, but Senator McCain brought up the question on troop levels. And you mentioned the Army. I noticed that yesterday -- I guess it was last week -- General Conway talked about the Marine Corps and problems that they have right now that is in terms of troop strength -- not troop availability for the combat situation, but troop strength.

His statement is: "We could not operate at the current OPTEMPO without troop increases."

You addressed the Army shortages. What about the Marines?

GATES: I would certainly be willing to look at that, Senator. Most of the materials that I've been given in preparation for these hearings have focused on the Army, but I'm certainly willing to look at the same issues with respect to the Marine Corps.

INHOFE: Thank you, Dr. Gates. And I do appreciate our early conversation on Wednesday.

INHOFE: Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator. I wish to advise the committee that Senator Levin and I have just received a communication from the Iraq Study Group. They welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee at 9:30, Thursday morning, to discuss in detail their report.

At this time, I recognize our distinguished colleague from West Virginia, Senator Byrd.

BYRD: Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

And, Dr. Gates, our relationship goes back over a number of years.

Do you support -- now, we hear all these rumors about the potential for an attack on Iran due to its nuclear weapons program, or on Syria due to its support of terrorism.

Do you support an attack on Iran?

GATES: Senator Byrd, I think that military action against Iran would be an absolute last resort, that any problems that we have with Iran, our first option should be diplomacy and working with our allies to try and deal with the problems that Iran is posing to us.

I think that we have seen, in Iraq, that once war is unleashed, it becomes unpredictable. And I think that the consequences of a military conflict with Iran could be quite dramatic.

And therefore, I would counsel against military action except as a last resort and if we felt our vital interests were threatened.

BYRD: Do you support an attack on Syria?

GATES: No, sir, I do not.

BYRD: Do you believe the president has the authority, under either the 9/11 war resolution or the Iraq war resolution, to attack Iran or to attack Syria?

BYRD: To the best of my knowledge of both of those authorizations, I don't believe so.

WARNER: Would you briefly describe your view of the likely consequences of a U.S. attack on Iran?

BYRD: It is awkward to talk about hypotheticals in this case, but I think that while Iran cannot attack us directly, militarily, I think that their capacity to potentially close off the Persian Gulf to all exports of oil, their potential to unleash a significant wave of terror, in the Middle East and in Europe and even here in this country, is very real.

They are certainly not being helpful in Iraq and are doing us -- I think, doing damage to our interests there.

But I think they could do a lot more to hurt our effort in Iraq.

I think that they could provide certain kinds of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons to terrorist groups.

Their ability to get Hezbollah to further destabilize Lebanon I think is very real.

GATES: So I think that while their ability to retaliate against us in a conventional military way is quite limited, they have the capacity to do all of the things, and perhaps more, that I just described.

BYRD: What about an attack on Syria? Would you briefly describe your view of the likely consequences of a U.S. attack on Syria?

GATES: I think the Syrian capacity to do harm to us is far more limited than that of Iran.

But I believe that a military attack by the United States on Syria would have dramatic consequences for us throughout the Middle East in terms of our relationships with a wide range of countries in that area. I think that it would give rise to significantly greater anti-Americanism than we have seen to date. I think it would immensely complicate our relationships with virtually every country in the region.

BYRD: Would you say that an attack on either Iran or Syria would worsen the violence in Iraq and lead to greater American casualties?

GATES: Yes, sir, I think that's very likely.

BYRD: Your answer is yes on both questions?

GATES: Yes, sir, very likely.

BYRD: With respect to Osama bin Laden, within eight months of taking Baghdad, our troops captured Saddam Hussein. However, five years after 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden is still on the loose.

BYRD: Who is responsible, Dr. Gates, in your judgment, for the 9/11 attacks, Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden?

GATES: Osama bin Laden, Senator.

BYRD: Over the past five years, who has represented the greater threat to the United States, Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden?

GATES: Osama bin Laden.

BYRD: How do you intend to catch Osama bin Laden?

GATES: Senator, I have no doubt that our forces have been trying their best to find Osama bin Laden. I'm not familiar with the effort that has been devoted to this over the past two or three years.

I will say I think Osama bin Laden has become more of a symbol for jihadist terrorists than an active planner and organizer of terrorist attacks. In fact, one of the consequences of our success in Afghanistan has been the denial of that country as a place to plan these sophisticated terrorist operations, such as the attacks that took place on 9/11.

GATES: So I think that while it's important to continue the search for Osama bin Laden, I think that his ability to directly organize and plan the kind of attacks against us that hurt us so bad in September of 2001 is very limited now.

And I think that it's important to keep him on the run.

I have always said that I thought it was much more difficult to find a single individual like him, and particularly in as rugged a place as Afghanistan, as a lot of people think. We had a great deal of difficulty finding Noriega in Panama in 1990, and we knew that country as well as practically we knew our own.

So finding these single individuals who are on the run -- we had the same problem trying to find the hostages in Beirut in the early 1980s.

The challenge is figuring out where they're going to be, not where they've been, and getting the information in a way that is timely enough to act on it. And, frankly, I just think we haven't had that kind of intelligence on bin Laden.

The way we'll catch bin Laden eventually, in my view, is that, just as in the case of Saddam Hussein, one of his own people will turn him in.

BYRD: Well, now, Dr. Gates, what is wrong -- my time is up, but what is wrong with our current tactics which have allowed Osama bin Laden to escape justice for five years and continuing?

GATES: Senator, I would make it a priority to find out what our tactics have been and the efforts that we have had under way if I'm confirmed for this position.

BYRD: Thank you, sir, for your responses.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator Byrd.

Senator Roberts?

ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, sir, for your very fine leadership on the committee. And I will not go into a detailed laudatory speech in your behalf, but I think everybody on the committee certainly has been inspired by your service.

Bob Dole and I are very proud of Dr. Gates, since he is a native Kansan, so I won't repeat that.

But I want to say that everybody in Kansas is very enthusiastic about your nomination, sir, and very happy.

ROBERTS: If you could let Texas A&M go a little easy on Kansas and Kansas State, but that's another whole matter.

And I want to thank you for your hour of good discussion in your courtesy call when we met in the Intelligence Committee. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I'd like to inform my colleagues who are worried about telling truth to power, that we went over a considerable amount of ground; more especially the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, which was wrong and symbolic of an egregious world intelligence failure.

And I told Dr. Gates that, on the Intelligence Committee, we don't take anything at face value. Now we say: What do you know? What don't you know? What do you think? And what's the difference?

And he agreed with that.

So I think, with you and General Hayden and John Negroponte, more especially with your understanding of intelligence, that you're going to make an excellent team.

And while I share the concern -- who are always concerned about truth to power -- I have no doubt that you will do that, sir.

I want to talk about two realities, if I can, whether it to be Levin plan or the Warner plan or the ISG plan or those who wish to leave yesterday or anybody's plan, all combined with the criticism and the election and the politics and serious growing problems in Iraq.

It seems to me the Iraqis -- I share a little bit reversed view that my distinguished colleague, Senator Levin has -- I think the Iraqis know we're leaving. And I think we've seen that in the Al Anbar Province where you don't find imams and the people and the leaders that you used to find.

ROBERTS: They've left. And you have thugs, thieves and Al Qaida. And so, if in fact, the Iraqis know we're leaving, the key is how and when; hopefully, with stability.

And on one hand, the lessons of the British experience, for 10 years, way back in the 1930s, now replicated, in Iraq, with all the tribal warfare, some even believe that stability may not be possible.

I know Senator McCain spoke to that. So we've heard much about all the current problems in Iraq and the new policy options, and withdrawal. I think everybody in this room would like to see our people home as soon as possible. And we talked about this.

And then you mentioned something in your opening speech and you mentioned something to me. And it said something about geo-political national security threats if the withdrawal -- i.e. just simply leave, extricate ourselves -- if it was very precipitous, that we would face very grave geopolitical national threats.

Now, with all due respect, I want you to get down to the level of the people of Wichita, College Station and everybody's hometown here and go over that a little bit in terms of their daily lives and pocketbooks.

We can talk about geopolitical national threats. It sounds pretty good, but what does that mean to them?

To me, it means if you leave Iraq in a precipitous fashion -- and we may want to do that down the road; I don't know -- what happens in Afghanistan?

What happens in Iran?

We've had a lot of questions about Iran. What happens to that Shia crescent with Iran and Syria and Lebanon, and then what happens to Israel?

And what happens in North Korea, with Kim Jong Il, when he sets off a new round of tests in regards to his missiles?

What happens in China and our relationship with Taiwan?

What happens in Russia, where we have a rather poisonous situation, now, with Mr. Putin?

(LAUGHTER)

What happens with Mr. Hugo Chavez, who's involved in five elections south of our border. He's won three. I say "won three." He has had influence in three.

And what Senator McCain said, some time ago, "The attacks can follow us home."

We had five attacks prior to our entry in Iraq: Beirut and Khobar Towers, USS Cole, embassy bombings, the '93 attack on the World Trade Center, and then, of course, 9/11.

ROBERTS: Will these attacks follow us home with the sleeper cells that are now in this country not so asleep and the second- generation terrorists?

I think we have to tell the American people, yes, we want everybody home as soon as possible, but if we do it the wrong way we're going to face a lot of credibility problems and a lot of dangers that they have to understand affects their daily lives and pocketbooks.

Would you comment, sir?

GATES: Senator, I suppose I should just say I agree.

(LAUGHTER)

ROBERTS: Well-stated.

GATES: My greatest worry, if we mishandle the next year or two and if we leave Iraq in chaos, is that a variety of regional powers will become involved in Iraq, and we will have a regional conflict on our hands.

Iran is already involved in Iraq and, as I suggested earlier to Senator Byrd, could become much more so.

The Syrians have not been helpful in Iraq, but could become much more harmful to our effort.

But I think that it would be very surprising if the other Sunni countries in the Middle East would allow the Sunni population in Iraq to be the victims of an ethnic cleansing. I think that the Turks would not sit by idly if they saw Iraq beginning to fall apart.

So I think that you could have Saudi Arabia, you could have Turkey, Syria, Iran, all would be involved. We're already seeing Hezbollah involved in training fighters for Iraq.

GATES: I think all of that could spread fairly dramatically. And as you suggest, I think the manner of our managing the next phase in Iraq has very strong lessons for other countries in the world. There's no question. In fact Osama bin Laden's been very straightforward about the impact on him of our withdrawal from Somalia after our soldiers were killed there.

And so I think that there is a risk that others looking around the world would see that we don't have the patience and we don't have the will. So I think those are some of the concerns that we would face if we end up leaving Iraq in chaos.

ROBERTS: I have a blue card, which everybody up here seems to ignore. But at any rate, I just want to add two cents worth in to my good friend and colleague Senator Inhofe in regards to the National Guard equipment that we need in Kansas, and we need in Kansas for our local missions there, but they're coming back, as you know, the equipment is coming back and we are in a world of hurt in regards to maintaining that equipment capability not only in Kansas, but in every state represented here and in the Congress.

And so I do hope that you'll visit with us about the Guard and the equipment that we have to have to have security and protection in regards to our states, but also is being used in the national security effort.

And I thank you for your testimony, sir.

GATES: Yes, sir.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Lieberman?

LIEBERMAN: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Gates, thank you for your agreement to serve your country again.

You said something in your opening comments that struck me personally, which is that you were here for two reasons: One, you love your country; and, two, your president asked you to serve it.

And I know you well enough over the years to know that those are not words that somebody else wrote for you, but they come from within you. They're an inspiration and a model, I think, for all of us. And I thank you for them.

I want to build on some of the questions that Senator Roberts asked.

LIEBERMAN: You've said this morning, quite appropriately, that the war in Iraq will be your highest priority and that you are open to the widest range of alternative strategies for Iraq. But as you just repeated -- but -- you said "but" -- you are very concerned that developments in Iraq in the next year or two will have a very significant influence on the Middle East generally and on the shape of global politics for years to come.

So is it fair for us to conclude that in accepting the president's nomination to be secretary of defense that in regard to Iraq, while all of us, of course, would like to bring our troops home as soon as possible, that your primary goal is to advise the president how to succeed in Iraq, not how to withdraw our troops at any and all costs?

GATES: Yes, sir. I think that my goal and the reason that I accepted the position was really twofold. The first is to try and find a path forward in Iraq that allows us to achieve the objectives of stabilizing the country so that it can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself and be an ally in our war on terror.

LIEBERMAN: Right.

GATES: And that really is the purpose.

And the whole idea is, in my view, that the faster that you can make the that you can make the Iraqi forces more effective and able to protect themselves and begin to get a handle on their problems -- on their security problems and diminish the sectarian violence, then the sooner we can begin to draw down our forces as the president has said.

But it also goes back to the point -- this isn't entirely a military problem.

LIEBERMAN: Right.

GATES: And the Iraqis are going to have to make some difficult decisions themselves, not only in terms of how they deal with sectarian violence, but how they approach national reconciliation: How are they going to distribute the oil revenues fairly so that everyone has a stake in the society; how are they going to relate it to the national reconciliation; how are they going to ensure that these different ethnic and religious groups can live together peacefully?

GATES: Those, I think, those are some of the political decisions that the Iraqis have to make, in addition to standing up their military.

So what I am interested in is figuring out if there is a better way in which we can achieve those objectives than has been the case in the past.

I would say also, Senator Lieberman, that there's a second reason why I agreed to become a nominee for this position. I believe very deeply that one of the fundamental factors in our success in the Cold War was our ability to have a broad, bipartisan agreement on the fundamental strategy on how to deal with the Soviet Union through nine successive presidencies and many congresses -- both Republicans and Democrats in support.

Now, we argued and fought a lot about tactics and this and that, but there was, fundamentally, agreement on how to approach the Soviet Union.

I think that it is imperative, in this long war on terrorism that we face that could go on for a generation, that there be a bipartisan agreement.

It probably wouldn't include everybody; that's too difficult. But if could you get broad agreement on a path forward not only in Iraq, but then in terms of how we fight this long war, then there would be consistency on the part of whoever is elected president in 2008 and beyond, so that we can carry on this struggle in a way that they don't think we're going to cut and run; that they don't think we're going to walk away from this war on terrorism; and so that they don't think it's going to be easy to start attacking us here at home because we're not willing to take them on abroad.

GATES: And so, I see it as one of my priorities during the time that I have this position, if I'm confirmed, to do what I can in working with the members of Congress in both parties to see if we can forge that kind of a bipartisan approach going forward so that everybody around the world who wishes us ill knows that we're in this for the long haul.

LIEBERMAN: I could not agree with you more. I thank you for your answer. Our nation, this Capitol, this government desperately needs to reach out and grasp each other's hands so that we can go forward to meet the enemies that we have in common as Americans, not divided between Democrats and Republicans. And your history tells me that you can do that.

I want to come back to what we said before. One, of course, the Iraqis have to reach some kind of political agreement and show political leadership to get the country to where they and we want it to be. But it's not just politics that will bring Iraq to where we and they want them to be. It also requires security.

Am I right about that?

GATES: Yes, sir.

LIEBERMAN: And is it fair to say that, because of your concern about the potential for a regional conflagration and that we not leave Iraq in chaos, it is highly unlikely that you would recommend to the president the beginning of a withdrawal of American troops without regard to conditions on the ground in Iraq?

GATES: I think any decision, Senator, with respect to troops levels, first of all I would seek the views of the commanders themselves. But I think that any decision on troop levels has to be tied to the situation on the ground in some respect.

LIEBERMAN: And that an increase or surge in the number of American troops there -- for instance, to better embed American coalition forces with the Iraqi security forces, which is an idea that has been embraced by many -- and the potential for a surge or a temporary increase in American troops is one of the options that you would consider as part of your review now?

GATES: That certainly is an option. And related to that might be: Do we have a sufficient number of trainers? If our focus is on training and bringing up the Iraqi army, do we have enough trainers to do that job in Iraq? And should we be embedding more of our troops with the Iraqis?

I think these are all questions that need to be examined.

LIEBERMAN: I thank you, Dr. Gates.

Mr. Chairman, if I may, I want to just read -- and I have no further questions. Appreciation what Dr. Gates has said about a bipartisan foreign and defense policy.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who Senator Boren quoted in his eloquent opening introduction of you, defined bipartisan foreign policy in this way: "It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate in determining our position. On the contrary, frank cooperation and free debate are indispensable to ultimate unity. In a word, bipartisan foreign policy simply seeks national security ahead of partisan advantage."

That's the goal that I heard you express, and I think if you can help us reach that in the next two years, you will have done your country extraordinary service.

Thank you.

GATES: Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Sessions?

SESSIONS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity and for your leadership of this committee -- you've done so well.

SESSIONS: You served at the end of World War II in Korea; secretary of the Navy; and have led this committee with fairness and patriotism and wise counsel. And it's been an honor to serve with you and to travel to some of these hot spots with you.

We have many challenges in the Defense Department, Dr. Gates: transformation to make sure our equipment and weaponry meet the needs that we'll be facing down the road, whether costs -- sometimes I think our costs are out of control for our systems. We need technology, the right technology. We need to reset equipment, as several have noted. I'm aware that we have great costs that are adding up there. And we've got to nurture and sustain and honor the men and women who serve us in harm's way in our military.

They have to be affirmed in every single way that we can do so, because it is the greatest treasure we have; those people who are prepared to go into harm's way, without complaint, to serve our country.

And I've talked to their families; I've talked to those who've lost their lives. And they have that sense of duty and mission, and we in Congress must do nothing to undermine their selfless patriotism and we have to affirm them.

But our biggest challenge right now, I think all of us would agree, is how to handle the situation in Iraq. That's fallen in your lot. You've come back now after 26 years in the intelligence service. You've briefed presidents. You've been in tough situations before.

Do you feel that that experience can help you think through with some new perspective on these issues? How would that experience of being in the White House and in the top counsels of the government discussing matters of war and peace help you today?

GATES: Well, Senator, I think that perhaps one of the areas that it helps the most -- perhaps some would think it ironic -- is that it has given me an appreciation of how all the different parts of the government need to work together to get anything done.

And there are always huge bureaucratic interests at stake in disputes among agencies; sort of the "Who's in charge?" question. And one of the things that I learned a long time ago is that -- and this is probably one of the reasons why the political science professors don't let me in their classrooms, because I tell them to throw away the organization charts; that it's personal relationships that matter. And when the secretary of state and secretary of defense aren't speaking to one another, it actually matters in the counsels of government.

And so one of the most important lessons that I've learned is to remember that we all work for the same boss and that boss, ultimately, is the people of the United States. And that it's important for the agencies and the organizations to work together.

Some of the things that the Iraq Study Group heard early on were problems among our agencies in collaborating, in cooperating with one another, coordinating their efforts.

So I think that one of the most significant lessons that I've learned is the importance of the entire government pulling together as a team.

And I would say that the other experience, frankly, has been at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue, because most of that time that I was in government I was also dealing with the Congress.

And the importance of the consultations, the importance of a lack of surprises, the importance of treating people's views with respect, I think are all important lessons learned.

I also think I learned a thing or two about bureaucratic in- fighting myself. I don't think I come to this as a particularly naive person in terms of how to get things done in this city.

And I think the other lesson that I learned over time was a respect for the professionals.

GATES: And it's something, frankly, that I've carried on since then and at the university. And I think it works.

And that is that when you treat the professionals in an organization who deliver the mission -- who perform the mission of the organization with respect and you listen to them and you pay attention to them, I think that everybody is better served. They were there before you got there, they'll be there after you leave, and if you don't make them a part of the solution, they will become a part of the problem.

I learned part of those lessons the hard way. In my first senior position, I was probably too harsh on people.

And when I started working with -- as the deputy to Judge Bill Webster, when he came over after nine years of leading the FBI and came over to direct the CIA, Judge Webster taught me a lot about how to get things done in a big organization and to use the professionals -- even though you're setting the goals and you have the vision, how to use the professionals to get the job done.

So those are some of the lessons that I think I've learned and that I would bring to this position if I'm confirmed.

SESSIONS: Thank you.

I do believe that you do bring the kind of perspective, and having been away for a while at the university will allow you to come back with a fresh approach. And I'm excited about that potential.

I also would say that your exchange with Senator Lieberman about the need for a bipartisan, maybe a tripartisan, foreign policy is very important. And Senator Boren's comments were extraordinarily important and wise and valuable to this committee.

And, Mr. Chairman, I would just say to Senator Levin, our chairman-to-be, I think your request and Senator Boren's, really, challenge, that we develop a long-term foreign policy, defense policy for this nation that Republicans and Democrats can sign on to and be a foundation for all that we do in the years to come, really is critical to our success as a nation. And we just have to move more in that direction, I think.

That has been a tradition in the past. Perhaps, for a lot of reasons, we've gotten away from it. But I hope that you can help lead us in that direction. From your comments today, I think you might.

Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator.

WARNER: And I wish to associate myself with your remarks and that is of Senator Lieberman and the witness that that goal has to be achieved, because we're going to be in a generational war on this question of terrorism. And we owe that obligation to the men and women of the armed forces that we ask to go out and accept the risk of loss of life and limb to make that possible.

Senator Reed?

REED: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And first let me recognize Dr. Gates' congressman, Chet Edwards, my friend and colleague from Texas. And his presence speaks volumes for you, Dr. Gates.

You are about to embark, I think everyone assumes, on a mission in the most perilous moment we've had in decades.

You've got an immediate crisis in Iraq; you've got enhanced strategic threats from Iran and North Korea with nuclear aspirations, and nuclear demonstrations with the case of North Korea; problems in Lebanon, problems in Afghanistan; the worst readiness position for our land forces we've seen in decades, our Army and Marine Corps; the continuing need to fight a global war on terror, and as you point out, in a bipartisan fashion that'll be sustained over many years.

You've got a budget that's substantial, including almost $500 billion in supplemental funding. Yet CBO suggests your procurement accounts are $53 billion to $121 billion short.

Welcome.

(LAUGHTER)

But I want to focus on Iraq. Much has been said today.

One of the problems, I think, with the strategy we've seen evolving over the last several years is the discussion in Washington seldom, I think, reflects the reality on the ground in Iraq. You've had the opportunity through Iraq Study Group to look at it.

My impression, and I want to see if it's your impression also, is that what started out as public disorder allowed a growing Sunni insurgency to begin to evolve.

REED: Certainly, there were Al Qaida elements trying to provoke this situation. But certainly, since the bombing of the mosque in Samarra, we've seen sectarian conflicts that many people characterize as civil war.

In fact, it's an existential conflict. Sunnis feel entitled to rule. Shia recall years -- centuries perhaps -- of oppression and they're fearful to their bones that they will be suppressed -- actually, destroyed -- if they surrender power.

In that context, do you feel that this is a civil war or a sectarian struggle? And the obvious question, then, is: What is the role of American military power in that struggle?

Senator Reed, I think that it's -- I guess my own view is that the situation today is more complex than a single title or a single source of causation accurately describes.

Not only has sectarian violence and Al Qaida in Iraq, you now have, as you suggested, significant disorder and -- an earlier senator indicated -- a lot of thuggery and criminal activity. We have the Iranians involved. The Syrians are clearly involved in the sense of they're allowing their border to be used and their country to be used as a sanctuary. I read news reports that Hezbollah is involved in training.

So regardless of how we got here, we are in a situation where it sounds like most of the bad guys in the Middle East are active in Iraq right now. And I don't know how you describe that.

My worry is: Left unconstrained, it begins to approach the chaos that I worry about and spoke about earlier. But I think all of those different factors are involved. And clearly, I would have to say the presence of U.S. forces is used as a provocation by some of those involved in this.

REED: Dr. Gates, we've talked about troop strengths, troop levels surging or re-deploying. And, frankly, there are several factors that govern troop strength. One is the condition of the grounds. But another most important one, I think, is the mission of those troops.

REED: The mission to date, I think, has been to train and leave. And that mission has been such that we've been able to sustain 150,000 troops there.

What should the mission of American forces be to accomplish the goals that the president has laid out and how many troops do we need to accomplish that mission?

GATES: Senator Reed, it seems to me that the goal of our troops at this point or the mission of our troops is really twofold. One is to try and improve the security environment. And the other is to prepare the Iraqi army; in particular, to take on that burden itself and increasingly perform that burden as U.S. troop presence draws down. So I think it's a twofold mission in that respect.

REED: And troop levels are a function of how you weight that mission. They're almost two distinct missions...

GATES: Yes.

REED: ... training mission or a try-to-stabilize-the-country mission.

And I think where we get hung up in, frankly, is try-to- stabilize-the-country mission.

And do you have any views as to whether we should be more robustly engaged in stabilization efforts there or if we should shift to more emphasis on training?

GATES: Well, one of the questions -- the honest answer to your question, Senator, is that I don't know. It's one of the things that as I talked to the commanders on the grounds and the chiefs and others I want to find out their views -- in other words, would they recommend putting significantly more trainers into Iraq in order to accelerate the process with the Iraqi army.

As I say, I just don't know the answer to the question. That's where -- one of those places where I very much am interested in the views of those on the ground.

REED: Just a final point, Doctor. There's a distinct possibility that whether we change our force structure, we redeploy, we will remain there as a presence for the foreseeable future -- training capacity, logistic capacity. But we could be in a situation where this chaos does disintegrate into something like ethnic cleansing, rampant violence, and we would find ourselves, in the position with American forces on the ground, in a very unstable situation with very adverse consequences to the people of Iraq.

REED: Is that a possibility that you at least will -- you'd at least consider?

GATES: It certainly is a possibility, yes, sir.

REED: And you will try to think a way through that dilemma?

GATES: Yes, sir.

REED: Thank you.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

Senator Collins?

COLLINS: Thank you.

Dr. Gates, I talked with an individual on Sunday night who knows you very well, and he described you to me as a person who always puts duty, honor and country first. And he said that that is why you had answered the president's call.

I think that's also true of our distinguished chairman who also always puts duty, honor and country first.

And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well for your distinguished leadership of this committee.

As I look at the issues facing us with Iraq, I think it comes down to a fundamental issue. Sectarian violence now jeopardizes the very existence of the nation of Iraq. It has cost us many lives, including the lives of thousands of innocent Iraqis.

And the question is, would withdrawing American troops, either a phased withdrawal starting in four to six months as the distinguished minority member of this committee has proposed, or the kind of modest withdrawals and reducing of the American footprint in Iraq, as Secretary Rumsfeld is apparently now proposing, the question is, what would be the impact on sectarian violence? Do you believe that the withdrawal of American troops would decrease the sectarian violence or would it leave Iraq in chaos and cause even more bloodshed?

GATES: Senator Collins, I would answer the question in two ways. First, I think it depends on the conditions on the ground under which the troops were withdrawn.

But second, you know, I wouldn't pretend. A number of members of this committee have been to Iraq many more times than I have and have talked to the commanders on the grounds many more times than I have.

My evaluation of the impact of troop levels and so on on the situation on Iraq I think, frankly, is too uninformed to be helpful. And that's one of the reasons why I indicated that one of the first things that I would do if I were confirmed would be to go to Iraq and sit down and talk to those ground commanders -- the commanders on the ground to find out what their views are about these different alternatives that we've been talking about.

I've been talking about that, sort of, everything is on the table. But the first thing that I want to find out is: What do the commanders think about this? What do they think about these different options? And what do the chiefs think?

I'm not smart enough and I'm not well enough informed at this point, I think, to make a useful judgment.

COLLINS: OK.

I want to switch to a different issue that we discussed briefly in my office.

As chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I've worked very closely with the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction. He has done a superb job in uncovering and exposing numerous cases of outright fraud in contracting in Iraq, and putting a spotlight on wasteful practices.

Regrettably, a provision was included in the defense authorization bill that would prematurely terminate the Office of the Special Inspector General next year.

I have joined with a number of my colleagues on the committee, including the chairman, the ranking member, Senator Lieberman, Senator Feingold and several other senators, in pushing legislation to extend the term of the special inspector general. His work is vital, and I believe it must be continued as long as we're sending billions of taxpayer dollars in Iraq.

Have you reached a judgment on whether the term of the inspector general should be extended beyond next year?

GATES: Senator, is this Mr. Bowen?

COLLINS: Yes, it is.

GATES: I must say that I think that -- I won't speak for the others on the Iraq Study Group, but I think that I certainly was very impressed when Mr. Bowen came and spoke to us and talked to us about a number of things that he'd been involved in.

And it certainly seemed to me that he was actually making a really constructive contribution to the war effort in Iraq, in some of the problem he identified and pointed out a pathway to correct.

If I were confirmed, I would be supportive of continuing that effort.

COLLINS: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Collins.

I thank you for your leadership on the question of that particular individual. I, too, have worked with him and very impressed with his forthright assessment of the area of experience to which he had responsibility in Iraq.

Senator Akaka?

AKAKA: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with some of the comments that were made about your leadership as chairman of this committee. And I want to tell you that, personally, you have been an outstanding chairman of this committee. And I wish you well in the future.

WARNER: I thank you, Senator, very much.

AKAKA: I also want to join my colleagues here in welcoming the distinguished Dr. Gates to this hearing.

AKAKA: And it was great to hear a person who loves this country as you do, to say the things as you have said about the dilemma that we now face in Iraq and the ways in which you intend to approach all of this.

I like your feeling of the importance of stability as one of the goals that we need to achieve in Iraq as soon as we can. I like your thoughts of being an ally with Iraq also and to work with them and also to help them, as we intend to do, to help them protect themselves.

And all of these are certainly a basis of bringing about a great county in Iraq.

And I know that you're looking at this through -- as what has been said, with fresh eyes and a fresh look, which is very, very appealing to me, I should tell you.

And I so glad to hear you talk about approach toward national reconciliation for Iraq as being very important.

AKAKA: And all of these we need to consider as we look at how we can make positive differences in Iraq.

And what's coming to me presently is that we cannot continue to depend on defense -- the Department of Defense as a department that can resolve many of these problems; that we need to look at the State Department as well and to include the State Department in all of these deliberations.

And I like your position about working together and through our partners across the globe in order to counter the threat of violent extremism.

And these are huge goals. But I'm glad you're talking about that. And for me, I'm here to support you on these.

If confirmed, Dr. Gates, what steps will you take to effectively build the support of the international community for ongoing efforts to stabilize Iraq?

GATES: Senator Akaka, clearly the lead in terms of dealing with other countries belongs to the secretary of state. But I think that our defense relationships, our military relationships and our exchange programs with many countries do provide the secretary of defense and our military leaders with the opportunity to win friends for the United States around the world.

And there are countries that I, frankly, believe are underappreciated, even among our own allies.

I think that the United States too often is alone almost in our embrace of Turkey and working with the Turks. And I think that they've been a very important member of NATO for a long time and an underappreciated one.

And the Turks offer us a tremendous amount in terms of both Central Asia as well as the Middle East, as well as being a NATO ally.

GATES: So there are countries like that where I think our defense relationships and the personal relationships are very important. I've been, frankly, surprised by the number of letters I've received from foreign government officials welcoming my nomination to this position. And I was, I suppose, most surprised that the first communications I got were from both the Israeli government and from several Arab governments.

So my hope is that under the leadership and guidance of my friend, the secretary of state, that if I'm confirmed for this job, that in fact I can make some kind of a contribution in that respect. And I think our military -- senior military leadership can do the same thing.

AKAKA: Thank you for that, as I'm indicating, that we cannot continue to rely only on defense, but on the State as well and other departments, such as Commerce and Agricultural and others that can certainly help to bring these about.

I'd like to ask a question that has to do with DOD. As you know, DOD has been granted authority to establish a new personnel system, NSPS, which is National Security Personnel System, that must preserve -- and we know that NSPS needs to also preserve collective bargaining.

However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has ruled that the regulations implementing NSPS failed to ensure collective bargaining.

AKAKA: And my question to you: What is your opinion of NSPS regulations affecting collective bargaining?

GATES: Senator, I'm aware of this legislation but, quite honestly, have not had the opportunity to look at the regulations or become familiar with the details of the program. I'd be happy to do that if I am confirmed.

AKAKA: Thank you.

Thank you very much. My time is finished.

WARNER: Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Graham?

GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add my voice to many others who have praised you for your leadership. I've really enjoyed being on this committee and you've made it a real pleasure to serve here.

Dr. Gates, thank you for your willingness to serve. It looks like we're going to be working together for at least a couple more years. Things are going pretty well for you right now.

Iran: Do you believe the Iranians are trying to acquire lethal weapons capability?

GATES: Yes, sir, I do.

GRAHAM: Do you think the president of Iran is laying when he says he's not?

GATES: Yes, sir.

GRAHAM: Do you believe the Iranians would consider using that nuclear weapons capability against the nation of Israel?

GATES: I don't know that they would do that, Senator. I think that the risks for them, obviously, are enormously high. I think that they see value.

GRAHAM: If I may?

GATES: Yes, sir.

GRAHAM: The president of Iran has publicly disavowed the existence of the Holocaust, has publicly stated that he would like to wipe Israel off the map. Do you think