MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: End of Tour Memorandum

Dear Mr. Secretary:

After 38 years of service to this great Nation, I shall depart the Office of Chief of Staff, Army on 11 June 2003 and retire from the active ranks on 31 July 2003. Pursuant to my responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as articulated in Section 151 of Title 10, US Code, I feel duty bound to provide you with some of my closing thoughts concerning The Army, the Department of Defense, and the security of the United States. In doing so, I follow a precedent that goes back to at least the retirement of Matthew B. Ridgway in June of 1955. I offer these comments in an attempt to be helpful as you continue to lead the Department of Defense in addressing near-term threats around the world while transforming to meet future, but yet unknown, challenges.

First, I would like to express my appreciation for the great honor that has been bestowed upon me to lead our magnificent Army. General Ridgway, who also served 38 years, stated that, “I cannot conceive that God has granted any man a richer, fuller, more satisfying life than mine, for it was spent in service with, and for, that finest product of our civilization – the American soldier.” I do not purport to belong on the same pages of history as Matthew Ridgway, but I do share his sentiments of appreciation for the opportunity to lead America’s Army and for his affection and regard for our service men and women.

As the Chief of Staff, Army, I considered my mission essential tasks to include three functions: assist the Secretary of The Army in leading The Army as part of the joint force; garner resources to support near-, mid-, and long-term Army readiness; and manage risk to the force and to our Soldiers. The performance of these functions has sometimes led to disagreements with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). While our disagreements have been well-chronicled, and sometimes exaggerated, these professional disagreements were never personal, never disrespectful, and never challenged the foundational principle of civilian control of the military in our form of government. When the discussions were about the national security, I felt it was my duty to provide my best professional military advice.
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Examples where statements have been misinterpreted involve my recent February 2003 appearance before Congress, where an estimate of forces required to stabilize a post-war Iraq was raised, and the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the Crusader program. During the February testimony, I didn’t believe there was a “right” answer on the number of forces required to stabilize Iraq until the commander on the ground had the chance to conduct both his mission analysis and a troop to task assessment. Given Senator Levin’s questioning, I gave an open-ended answer suggesting a non-specific larger, rather than smaller, number to permit you and General Franks maximum flexibility in arriving at a final number. I felt that an artificially low number would impose a premature force cap that would increase risk and jeopardize mission success unnecessarily. My estimate, based upon past experiences, was provided in a way so as not to foreclose options for you or the Combatant Commander. It was, indeed, unfortunate that I did not have the opportunity to explain the rationale for my response before the matter became a public issue. As a matter of fact, neither you nor Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz ever discussed this issue with me despite all the commentary in the press.

The cancellation of Crusader provides another example where my actions have been misinterpreted or misconstrued by you and your office. Crusader was approved for inclusion in your budget proposal and approved for inclusion in the President’s budget submission to the Congress. Both Secretary of the Army White and I were instructed to testify in support of the President’s budget; instructions we willingly carried out during our February 2002 testimonies. Without any consultation or forewarning, you declared your intent to terminate the program in the middle of budget marks with the expectation that Secretary White would explain this reversal to the military oversight committees. It was not Crusader, but the requirement for organic, indirect cannon artillery fires for ground maneuver forces that was the issue. The suggestion that The Army did not need cannon artillery and that it fared well without those fires in Operation Anaconda was simply wrong and untrue. My May 2002 testimony, before Senator Levin’s committee, sought to reinforce The Army’s requirement for organic, indirect cannon artillery. That said, The Army and OSD have worked this issue extremely hard, and we now have a solution, via the FCS program, that meets our long-term requirements for organic, indirect fires.

Beyond these two clarifications, I would like to address four other topics in this memorandum. First, I will highlight some of The Army’s key accomplishments over the past four years – accomplishments that could not have been achieved without support from the Administration and the Congress. Second, I offer some thoughts about the criticality of maintaining a balance between near-term readiness and transformation initiatives. Third, I would like to highlight some key challenges and opportunities confronting DoD and The Army. Finally, I would like to comment on certain OSD processes. I hope these comments will be helpful in your efforts to lead DoD.
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Key Accomplishments of The Army

In 1999, The Army announced its Vision for the 21st Century centered on three pillars: People, Readiness, and Transformation. The intent of this Vision was to launch The Army on two strategic thrusts to better serve the national security interests of the United States. First, we had to take the Army of 1999 and rapidly change it to make it more relevant to near-term challenges. We didn’t know when war would come, but we did know that it would indeed come again. And when it came, it would be different than what we had planned for during the Cold War or experienced in Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The tragic events of 11 September and Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom have proven us right...war came and it was profoundly different. Second, we had to begin a transformation toward a capabilities-based force that would allow The Army, as part of the Joint team, to lead change while enabling it to execute missions across the full spectrum of the Nation’s requirements for the long-term. To achieve this capabilities-based force, we had to be able to project power anywhere in the world - - not just to the easily accessible areas with multiple air and sea ports, but also to the remote, desolate, landlocked and infrastructure poor areas, as well. Therefore, the only map that has remained in my office for the past 4 years is one of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia - - not that we really thought that we would fight there, but we knew that if we designed a force that could deploy, fight, and win – decisively – in that region, we could deploy and fight in any region of the world. This was the genesis of The Army Vision and, with the help of many from outside The Army, we have achieved considerable progress in achieving the Vision that we articulated in 1999.

I think it is important to point out that the Vision statement begins and ends talking about people. People are central to everything we do in The Army. Institutions don’t transform; people do. Platforms and organizations don’t defend the nation; people do. And finally, units don’t train; they don’t stay ready; they don’t grow and develop leadership; they don’t sacrifice and they don’t take risks on behalf of the Nation; people do. Without people in the equation, readiness and transformation are little more than academic exercises.

The very best people in the Nation are needed to serve in our Army. We now recruit and retain the very best to fill our formations, as demonstrated during actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and numerous other missions for which we have deployed Soldiers, at home and abroad. As has been the case for over 228 years, our magnificent moments as an Army continue to be delivered daily by our Soldiers. Caring for these wonderful Soldiers means applying world-class training and leader development programs that prepare them for their duties in a very uncertain world. To ensure continued success in recruiting and retention, we have, with your help, taken important strides in taking care of our people and their families with such improvements as
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TriCare for Life, pay raises, Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), and other Well-Being efforts.

We have met every challenge confronting The Army while sustaining an extremely high level of commitments across the globe. The successes in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), both here at home and around the world, are testament to our great Soldiers, their leadership, and the synergy achieved via ever-increasing Joint capabilities. Operations since the tragedy of 11 September 2001, have demonstrated that The Army has been remarkably adaptive and agile in its service to our Nation. We do not intend to rest on our accomplishments to date, as there is still much to be done.

The President described the challenges for Transformation in the 21st Century when he said, "Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or weeks rather than months." Acknowledging these challenges, we began to transform The Army, all components, into agile and flexible formations, with netted C4ISR packages, that will eventually allow us to put a combat capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours once we execute lift off, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in theater in 30 days. Achieving this capability will require a significantly reduced logistics footprint enabled by common chassis vehicles and common caliber weapons systems. But transformation of this magnitude is about much more than materiel - - it must be a holistic transformation that encompasses doctrine, organizations, training, leader development, people, and facilities. The Army has been working to achieve this capability for the Nation and, as the centerpiece of DoD Transformation, we intend to begin fielding this capability, the Objective Force, this decade.

In less than four years, The Army has delivered a much-needed capability with its Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) as an interim step toward the Objective Force. Two years ago, a mounted early entry force could not reinforce forcible entry operations by Special Operations or Airborne forces - - we have now validated that capability with our first SBCT.

Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the decisive effects of simultaneous, multidirectional, precision strike employing ground, sea, and air assets. However, we must be able to achieve similar results more quickly, in a more challenging environment, against a more competent enemy – and that is what The Army committed to four years ago. The Objective Force will enable Joint, Interagency, and Multi-National forces to deliver the decisive victories we seek. The successful FCS Milestone B decision on 14 May 2003 was a major step towards that objective.
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Maintaining the Balance Between Readiness and Transformation

Maintaining a suitable balance in distributing scarce resources between near-term readiness and far-term transformation is the most difficult and important challenge confronting DoD and Service leaders. To date, I believe The Army has maintained the right balance between recapitalization; modernization; and science and technology investments. The performance of our Legacy Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has validated our recapitalization and modernization investment decisions. Additionally, we began to see the dividends of our Science and Technology investments. Blue Force Tracking, superior communications technologies, enhanced Soldier equipment, and rudimentary robots are just a few examples of 2010 Objective Force investments paying dividends on the battlefield today. Army ground forces that fought in Iraq were not the same that fought Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Despite these investments, our legacy platforms are aging and the costs of maintaining them are skyrocketing prohibitively. Additionally, they do not provide the kind of lighter, more agile, and more lethal capabilities that we need for future ground forces. Any further enhancements to the Legacy Force should be selective, prudent, and carefully considered before diverting any funding from far-term Transformation efforts.

Six SBCTs remain the requirement, as we have articulated in our report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the rapid deployability, lethality, and sustainability of the SBCT would have provided operational commanders with significant additional options – unimpeded access to a northern front; protection of critical and expansive lines of communication; and robust urban capabilities, to name a few. The SBCTs provide critical mid-term capabilities while, at the same time, facilitating long-term Transformation. SBCTs also facilitate leader development and encourage cultural change and innovation by validating operational concepts and organizational models; enabling emerging training and leader development initiatives; and restructuring our acquisition processes.

For the long-term, the Objective Force's greater versatility, deployability, lethality, survivability, and sustainability will provide Combatant Commanders unprecedented strategic responsiveness for placing the right amount of combat power at the time and place of their choosing, for any mission on the spectrum of military operations. This kind of holistic transformation requires significant resources and can't be done "on the cheap."
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Again, allocating precious resources between near-term readiness and long-term Transformation, while maintaining acceptable risk, is a difficult challenge. We should closely examine emerging lessons coming from recent conflicts but must be patient not to draw quick, imprudent conclusions - - our track record for predicting our future adversaries has not been very good, and they are not likely to be as incompetent as Saddam Hussein nor as ill-equipped and isolated as the Taliban. I believe that a careful examination of these conflicts will show that balanced, multi-dimensional capabilities of the Joint Force are required to preserve the initiative, minimize asymmetric vulnerabilities, and present multiple, simultaneous dilemmas to any enemy.

Key Challenges and Opportunities Confronting DoD and The Army

The Army fully supports efforts to transform DoD to a capabilities-based force and understands that transforming The Army is essential to that end. To maintain momentum and direction, Transformation should be strategy-derived and should address both near-term requirements and risk, as well as far-term required enhancements and risk. There are several critical decisions facing DoD, in general, and The Army, in particular.

- **SBCTs Five and Six.** The Army's report to the DepSecDef re-affirms the need for six Stryker Brigades to provide Combatant Commanders with the capabilities they need to meet their requirements. Failing to field SBCTs 5 and 6 would extend the capabilities gap that has existed for over a decade and would also unnecessarily undermine much needed Reserve Component Transformation.

- **FCS and Objective Force.** We must sustain the momentum that The Army has achieved as a result of the highly successful FCS Milestone B decision. The capabilities of the FCS and Objective Force are what the Nation needs and the President has outlined. I am concerned about a loss in momentum, particularly given the realities of ongoing operations and the transition of Army leadership. OSD should designate FCS and the Objective Force as the flagship of DoD Transformation. FCS is truly Joint by design, but it will take DoD emphasis to ensure Joint capabilities are integrated with FCS to achieve the synergy necessary to support Combatant Commanders. Anything less than the FCS System of Systems, approved for design and development by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) on 14 May 2003, is mere modernization. The FCS program is executable so long as funds are not diverted. In general, we must move beyond “system” acquisition programs and toward spiral development of “system of systems” design, development, and acquisition - that requires a vetted and approved DoD 5000 process, with corresponding changes in the PPBS process that accounts for costing threshold capabilities over time.
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- **Culture.** Media reports often discuss your desire to transform The Army’s culture. If this is your intent, I submit that The Army has been transforming its culture for four years -- but it will take more time and tough, skilled leadership. It is also important not to undermine the war-fighting ethos of The Army. We must continue to grow the self-aware and adaptive leaders who delivered victory on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq and would have gone to Korea, if necessary. The Army’s leader development programs begin well before Soldiers reach the rank of sergeant, and they continue through the 4-star ranks -- and they work. No other Army in the world has the dynamic leader development and training programs we have, and no other Army has the adaptive and innovative leaders that we have -- that is why we are the most respected Army in the world. Notwithstanding our development of breath-taking technologies and the advent of powerful information tools, it is still about leadership and battle command, not C4ISR. C4ISR and the network are merely tools, which enable our leaders.

- **Headquarters and Echelons.** You and your staff have repeatedly questioned The Army’s echelons of command and pressed to reduce or eliminate headquarters and echelons. I would recommend that we “make haste slowly” here and that technology theorists not be allowed to hold sway over practical analysis and operational experience. The Army should be allowed to design and consider such changes as the Objective Force Unit of Employment (UE) as a potential solution to your concerns. We should not pre-determine the outcomes of valid analysis and we should take the lessons coming out of Afghanistan and Iraq and apply them to FCS and the Objective Force. For example, the multiple echelons in OIF below the CENTCOM-level proved invaluable in executing a constantly adaptive plan -- those echelons facilitated agile, “on-the-fly” task organizations and re-task organized themselves to meet a fluid tactical situation, constantly providing critical combat multipliers and coordinating responsive logistics support. As examples, during OIF, a mechanized infantry battalion was task organized to the 101st Air Assault Division, an armor battalion was task organized to the 82nd Airborne Division, and a tank company and fire support assets were task organized to the special operations task force. These dynamic relationships, supported by Army echelons and command and control structures, facilitated the agile and flexible application of combat power when and where it was needed to meet commanders’ requirements. Again, it’s about leadership, not fixed organizational designs.

To be more specific, the divisions of today are not the same as those of 12, or even four, years ago. References to “Napoleonic” structures demonstrate an ignorance of what our organizations do for Army and for Joint commanders. The future may allow for a consolidation of echelons once we achieve the technological breakthroughs we seek, but we shouldn’t trade “current capabilities” for “future possibilities” -- we need to achieve the Objective Force
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network first. OSD must establish this as an analysis-based decision, and listen to commanders with combat experience.

- **Army Support to Other Services (ASOS).** As lessons are learned and applied from recent conflicts and ongoing operations, there is great temptation to compare “tooth to tail ratios.” I would ask you to take cognizance of the contributions that The Army provides both to other Services and the SOF. They are consistently overlooked, which skews the perception of an overly tail-driven Army. In OIF, 33,220 Soldiers provided general support to the theater for everything from bulk fuel and water distribution to the theater communications network that we built and sustained. That included the delivery of 18 million gallons of bulk fuel to the Air Force and 10 million gallons of fuel and 9500 short tons of supplies to I MEF between 20 March and 19 April. Additionally, over 2700 other Soldiers provided direct support, including field artillery support, engineer support, and bridging capabilities, to I MEF. Another 6200 Soldiers provided direct and essential combat and combat service support to the SOF in Iraq during OIF. Adequate force structure and command and control must be provided, and ASOS included in force planning, if The Army is to continue to provide that type of support to our Joint and Coalition partners for decisive operations.

- **End Strength / Force Structure.** Any discussion of changes to end strength and force structure should be strategy-driven and grounded in solid data analysis that includes scenario driven war gaming. It is near impossible to undo the effects of bad end strength or force structure decisions because it takes a generation to redevelop the leaders and skill sets required to execute our warfighting doctrine. Looking at our mobilizations and force commitments over the last decade makes a powerful argument that we either need end strength and structure growth or far fewer requirements than we are currently carrying in our mission profile. The 1-4-2-1 force-sizing construct will prove to be ill-suited over the long-term, just like all previous force-sizing constructs. Additionally, we should acknowledge the imprecise nature of our strategic calculations as 1-4-2-1 does not adequately account for all GWOT requirements or long-term commitments to be associated with OEF in Afghanistan and OIF in Iraq, as well as other small-scale contingencies.

- **Overseas Presence and Stationing.** Similarly, our forward presence and stationing strategies should be grounded in a long-range strategic analysis. We should not give up any capabilities today unless analysis supports such a draw down. There is some intrinsic value to presence that cannot be easily quantified but should not be ignored. On a related issue, The Army has been criticized for not employing unit rotation policies similar in design to the concepts employed by the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. We are fully examining options to employ unit
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rotation policies, but OSD should be aware that a rotation policy will entail a greater than 3 to 1 ratio; many suggest a ratio that's probably closer to 5 to 1, as is currently employed by other Services and nations with long-term presence missions. Unless commitments are reduced, The Army cannot maintain both a coherent rotation policy and the requisite force and readiness levels to respond to unanticipated major crises with our current end strength and force structure.

- **AC/RC Mix.** This is an area in need of examination. It is absolutely true that our Nation has difficulty going to war without mobilizing significant parts of the Reserve Component because we have not traditionally maintained all capabilities required for war in the Active Component. Before we impose change, we should explicitly announce that we are changing the strategic calculation and the respective roles of the AC and RC. We must engage the Reserve Component in open dialogue and make them part of the solution as opposed to seeing them as part of the problem. Here also, we have the tools to analytically lay out the options for your review. To help address the issue for the Objective Force, The Army has commissioned an independent review to identify the future roles and missions of the Reserve Component.

- **Comanche and Aviation Modernization.** Our aviation force is aging. We need the armed, manned reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) capability that comes with the Comanche. The early history of this program has not been pretty, but the program has been restructured, is now sound, and deserves your continuing support. The need for a long overdue R&S capability was validated again in OIF where we asked Apache attack helicopter units to perform R&S as part of deep attack operations. This use of Apaches, not optimized for R&S, resulted in an unacceptably high rate of damaged and destroyed aircraft. This is an area that we must address with Comanche. The Army carries the Comanche requirement at 819 aircraft to fulfill Objective Force requirements.

- **Joint Deployment.** The Army is still slower to deploy than we would like. The fielding of the Stryker Brigades and the Objective Force will greatly ease the problem, but deployment issues will remain. Strategic deployment is not just an Army problem and requires a DoD/Joint solution. All Services contribute to the lift requirements but it is primarily tracked as an Army issue. We need to identify all the capabilities needed in the Area of Operations and then plan backwards to determine how to get those capabilities to the war. We currently identify what lift is feasible and then try to design the force to match the available lift – that is backwards. Finally, except for the forced entry and early entry operations, The Army expects that it will deploy primarily by sealift.
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- **Joint Operational Concepts and Strategy.** In terms of Joint Transformation, the Services are wandering in the wilderness without overarching concepts and a strategy. I strongly recommend that JFCOM quickly be divested of its force provider function in order to focus on experimentation and joint concept/doctrine development. There are other ways to handle JFCOM's force provider responsibilities and the Services would willingly participate in such a review.

- **Homeland Security.** Much remains to be done to determine long-term requirements for what is espoused to be our number one national security priority.

**Concerns with OSD Processes**

I am greatly concerned that OSD processes have often become ad hoc and long established conventional processes are atrophying. Specifically, there are areas that need your attention as the ad hoc processes often do not adequately consider professional military judgment and advice. First, the JROC process has largely supplanted the traditional role of the Tank and members of the JCS are not given the opportunity to express their best military judgment as often as they should. A failure to do so does not serve the President or the Nation very well. Second, there is a lack of strategic review to frame our day-to-day issues. A comprehensive strategic framework is required to provide consistency and long-term perspective. Otherwise, decisions tend to be made piecemeal and are often internally inconsistent. Third, there has been a lack of explicit discussion on risk in most decisions. Without this explicit discussion, there is opportunity to miscalculate with unacceptable consequences. For those of us who consider risk assessment to be part of our core responsibilities, it is much easier to execute decisions aggressively once risk has been quantified. Fourth, I have seen a tendency to compartmentalize analysis, both within OSD and then between OSD and the Services. All would be better served through a process where data and analysis is more easily shared so that decisions can be reached in a more transparent and cooperative fashion. Finally, I find it unhelpful to participate in senior level decision-making meetings without structured agendas, objectives, pending decisions, and other traditional means of time management.

**Conclusion**

Much has been written and said about the supposed ill will that exists between OSD and The Army, in general, and between you and me, in particular. For my part, I would say that much too much has been made of all that – the making of national defense policy and the critical decisions associated therein are not for the thin-skinned or faint of heart who are insecure in their public image. I am also secure in the knowledge that recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated The Army’s readiness to handle a broad range of missions on short notice and revalidated
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its critical role in the Nation’s defense. Further, your successful FCS Milestone B decision to pursue the Objective Force ensured The Army’s long-term relevance to the Nation’s security.

I would like to note that I have always respected your desires to remake the Department of the Defense to meet future challenges and understand the considerable responsibility the President has placed upon you to achieve Transformation while simultaneously meeting current threats. I also trust that you understand that I have felt it my duty to provide you with my best military judgment on issues of importance to The Army, the Department of Defense, and the Nation. I would again like to quote Ridgway’s description of the role of a military advisor:

*He should give his competent professional advice on the military aspects of the problems referred to him, based on his fearless, honest, objective estimate of the national interest, and regardless of administration policy at any particular time. He should confine his advice to the essentially military aspects.*

I would also like to quote then Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight Eisenhower, on the same subject, when testifying before Congress in 1947:

*I appear before you only as a professional soldier, to give you a soldier’s advice regarding the national defense. I am not qualified to proceed beyond that field; and I do not intend to do so. It is my duty as a Chief of Staff to tell you gentlemen what I believe to be necessary for national security.*

Over my four-year-tenure as The Army Chief of Staff, I have attempted to live up to the precedents established by men who have held this office. Once a new Secretary of the Army is in position and a new Chief of Staff is nominated and confirmed, I would expect that the new Chief would continue the tradition of providing his best military judgment and advice. I can only ask that you provide them the opportunity to deliver those judgments in an open and receptive fashion. In that way, today’s stories of ill will between OSD and The Army can be put to rest.
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Again, it has been my proud privilege to serve with America's finest men and women over the past 38 years. It has also been an honor to conclude my service to this great Nation as the 34th Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

Very respectfully,

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
34th Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
35th Chief of Staff, Army